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Araiza: Animus and its Discontents

ANIMUS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
William D. Araiza*
Abstract
The concept of “animus” has taken center stage in high-stakes
constitutional rights adjudication. Both in major equal protection cases
and, more recently, in litigation over President Trump’s immigration bans
and religion-based denials of commercial services to lesbians and gays,
animus has emerged as a favored doctrinal tool of courts committed to
protecting individual rights against majoritarian oppression. Despite—or
perhaps because of—its prominence, the animus concept has remained
controversial. Scholars have remarked on the difficulty of uncovering
animus, its tendency to inflame the culture wars, and its potential to
distract attention from other doctrinal paths that might be viewed as more
promising for emerging social groups. At the same time, other scholars
have attempted to create a workable animus doctrine from the Supreme
Court’s under-theorized applications of the concept in well-known cases
such as Romer v. Evans and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.
This Article considers the arguments made by both the critics and
defenders of the animus concept. After recounting the concept’s rise to
prominence and scholars’ responses to that rise, it presents an approach
to animus that both fits the Court’s analyses of the issue and harmonizes
it with its approach to a closely related doctrine: discriminatory intent.
This proffered approach answers the critics by explaining how courts can
competently detect animus while mitigating the worst effects of an
animus finding on public discourse on deeply contested concepts, and by
suggesting how animus doctrine can benefit equal protection law more
generally. That approach also fills in holes left by other scholars’
constructions of animus doctrine and refocuses animus away from
mistaken directions implied by some of those constructions.
This Article then proceeds to contextualize animus within the broader
sweep of American constitutional law by exploring the parallels between
the animus concept and the nineteenth-century idea of class legislation.
For over a century, the class legislation idea provided the prime
organizing principle for state, and later, federal, courts’ enforcement of
equality rights under both state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.
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By connecting that older idea with modern animus doctrine, this Article
aspires both to provide a stable doctrinal grounding for the animus
concept, and, in turn, to secure modern equal protection law on a firmer,
more historically legitimate, foundation.
This Article concludes by speculating more generally about the nature
of constitutional rights adjudication. In particular, it considers whether
such adjudication can ever hope to fully avoid the critique, leveled against
the animus concept, that it necessarily involves name-calling that
embitters the losing side and makes long-term social accommodation
more difficult. This Article suggests that this unfortunate dynamic may
often be inevitable, rather than simply a result of courts’ use of animusbased reasoning.
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INTRODUCTION
These should be halcyon days for the concept of animus in equal
protection law and constitutional law more generally. The concept,
grounded doctrinally in the Court’s famous statement that “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”1 can never
constitute a legitimate government interest, and more foundationally in
the requirement that government be allowed only to pursue publicregarding interests,2 has played a key role in significant court decisions
in recent decades.3 It served as the foundation for the Supreme Court’s
1985 decision striking down the government’s exclusionary zoning
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.4 Coming as it did
at the end of an opinion that effectively ended the Court’s
experimentation with political process-based suspect class analysis,
Cleburne’s animus rationale can be understood (at least in retrospect)5 as
having pointed the way toward a new approach to equal protection, at
least for groups who had not already won suspect or quasi-suspect class
status by then.
Since Cleburne, the animus idea has continued to be generative. Most
notably, it has been largely responsible for the impressive string of equal
protection victories won by gay and lesbian rights advocates at the Court,

1. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
2. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and
the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 275 (2011) (“The baseline of the
American constitutional order is a government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that
it has reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant that government's
actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate.”).
3. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP.
CT. REV. 183, 183 (“Across four decades, the concept of animus has emerged from equal
protection doctrine as an independent constitutional force.”).
4. 473 U.S. 432, 446–48 (1985).
5. It should be noted that the conjoining of the Court’s de facto rejection of suspect class
analysis and embrace of the animus concept was not something the justices intended. See William
D. Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 621, 622 (2017) (explaining, based
on a study of the justices’ publicly available records, that the Cleburne Court’s animus analysis
was an afterthought that was not consciously understood as the logical follow-up to its rejection
of suspect class status for the intellectually disabled plaintiffs in that case).
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in particular, Romer v. Evans6 and United States v. Windsor.7 It also
provided the foundation for Justice O’Connor’s equal protection-based
concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,8 and it arguably percolated under the
surface of Justice Kennedy’s 2015 majority opinion in Obergefell v.
Hodges.9 The Court’s embrace of this idea has been noticed by lower
courts, which over the last one and a half decades have shown themselves
more and more willing to decide cases on this ground.10 Most recently,
animus played an important role in several of the lower court opinions
invalidating the executive orders issued by President Trump to limit
immigration from majority-Muslim nations.11 The Supreme Court also
engaged the animus allegation, even if the majority in Trump v. Hawaii12
concluded that animus did not motivate the final iteration of the Trump
immigration orders.13 By contrast, the Court did embrace an animus
rationale in its much-anticipated Free Exercise Clause case, Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.14
The fact that the travel ban opinions and Masterpiece spoke,
respectively, of animus against religions and against religious believers,
and thus grounded their opinions on one or both of the First Amendment’s
6. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment as a
status-based “classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection Clause does not permit”).
7. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act’s “principal
effect [was] to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal”).
8. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I base my
conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).
9. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Indeed, such percolation should not be surprising, given that
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions in Romer and Windsor. The dignity focus that
permeated Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell, and which provides at least some indirect
connection to the animus idea, was also prominently featured in Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas. See 539 U.S. at 567 (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon [a]
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity
as free persons.”).
10. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1210–11 (D. Idaho
2015) (striking down Idaho’s “ag-gag” law as based on unconstitutional animus), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part sub nom.; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1200–01 (9th
Cir. 2018); Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1163–64 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (striking down state
same-sex marriage ban as based in animus); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 655 (W.D.
Tex. 2014) (same); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (striking down
state refusal to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages as based in animus); Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995–96 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (same).
11. See infra Section I.B (discussing the travel ban litigation).
12. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
13. See id. at 2421 (explaining that the President’s issuance of the challenged order came
only after the completion of “a worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials
and their agencies” and thus was not motivated by animus, despite the various anti-Muslim
statements the President made both as a candidate and as president).
14. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018).
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religion clauses, rather than the Equal Protection Clause,15 suggests the
flexibility and portability of the animus concept. These characteristics
will presumably make that concept all the more useful as the nation
confronts the prospect of renewed xenophobia and deep cultural conflict
on matters including but extending beyond religion.16
And yet, prominent scholars raise troubling questions about the
wisdom, coherence, or staying power of the animus concept. Steven
Smith and others have criticized the idea for its potential to inflame
political and cultural disagreement, given the allegedly disparaging
connotation of “animus.” Indeed, Professor Smith has gone so far as to
label such a doctrinal approach “the jurisprudence of denigration.”17
Other scholars have made similar arguments to courts. Indeed, in an
amicus brief in a pre-Obergefell same-sex marriage case, a group of
prominent legal scholars took the unusual position of urging the Court to
grant certiorari in one of the marriage cases without taking a position on
the proper outcome.18 Instead, they urged the Court simply to reject the
idea that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were enacted out of
animus.19 Echoing Professor Smith, these scholars warned that finding
that those laws were motivated by animus would “unnecessarily vilify”
those who oppose same-sex marriage and thereby “chill public debate.”20
They also argued that such motivations were fundamentally unknowable,
suggesting that voters who supported initiatives banning same-sex

15. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming an injunction based on plaintiff’s likely success on showing that President Trump’s
travel ban violated the Establishment Clause).
16. See, e.g., Andrew Keshner, Trump’s ‘Anti-Latino Commentary’ Could Play into
Brooklyn Judge’s Decision in DACA Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018, 4:27 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/judge-trump-anti-latino-speech-daca-casearticle-1.3788610 [https://perma.cc/2UNU-9EZH] (explaining that President Trump’s previous
demonstrations of anti-Latino sentiment “could be used against [him]” when courts consider the
legality of his proposed ending of the Dreamer program).
17. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
675, 677–78 (2014) [hereafter Smith, Denigration] (“[B]y maintaining and contributing
to . . . destructive discourse, [animus jurisprudence] aggravates the conflict that is often described,
with increasing accuracy, as the ‘culture wars.’”).
18. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Steven G. Calabresi, Daniel O. Conkle, Michael J.
Perry, and Brett G. Scharffs in Support of Certiorari and Opposing a Ruling Based on Voters’
Motivations at 2, Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (No. 14-124) [hereinafter Calabresi
Brief] (urging the Court to grant review in a same-sex marriage case, but, without arguing for a
particular result, simply arguing that the Court should reject an animus justification for striking
down state same-sex marriage bans).
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 9.
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marriage “without doubt acted from a number of motivations, many
entirely unrelated to animus.”21
Other scholars critique animus from other perspectives. Most notably,
Katie Eyer has characterized the animus concept as “descriptively
misleading and substantively problematic,” as part of her call for more
robust rational basis review across the board, rather than only in particular
cases where a court suspects animus.22 Writing both from a pedagogical
standpoint, but also out of concern for shaping judges’ and lawyers’
perceptions of the plausibility of rational basis argumentation, she urges
that those cases not be excised, as sui generis “animus cases,” from what
she calls “the rational basis canon.”23
Even scholars more sympathetic to the animus project have
sometimes laid bare problems and challenges the doctrine poses. Most
notably, Susannah Pollvogt and Dale Carpenter have defended the
usefulness of the animus idea and laid out approaches for a judicially
workable animus doctrine.24 Their approaches, however, leave
unanswered important questions about how courts should identify animus
and what the consequences should be of a decision that animus at least
partially infected a government action.
Writing in a related but distinct vein, Carlos Ball has attempted to
distinguish between different instances of anti-gay discrimination for
purposes of identifying animus.25 He endorsed the Court’s conclusion in
Windsor that the Defense of Marriage Act was motivated by animus.26
But he also defended Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell against the
charge, leveled by Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, that the majority
opinion unfairly characterized same-sex marriage opponents as bigots.27
Professor Ball’s careful distinction between Kennedy’s analysis in these
two cases, and his description of Obergefell as based in something other
than a dismissal of same-sex opponents as bigots, requires a nuanced
understanding of how different types of discrimination relate differently
to animus. In particular, it requires an understanding of how animus
relates both to the concept of bigotry and to the dignitary harms Justice

21. Id.
22. Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317,
1322 (2018).
23. Id. at 1320, 1336.
24. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 184 (“[T]he constitutional anti-animus principle remains
an unappreciated one.”); Susannah Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887,
888 (2012) (advancing a “comprehensive understanding of unconstitutional animus”).
25. Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 646–48, 661
(2016).
26. Id. at 639.
27. Id. at 640.
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Kennedy sought to remedy by rejecting the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage bans in Obergefell.28
The critiques noted above are serious, and the holes and ambiguities
they identify in animus doctrine are real. If animus doctrine is to have a
future—particularly in equal protection but also in constitutional law
more generally—it will have to develop responses, or, perhaps more
accurately, it will need to be adapted to blunt the strongest versions of
these critiques. This Article considers these objections—and, in the case
of sympathetic scholars, their insights—as part of a larger project of
constructing a theory and doctrine of animus that can lay legitimate claim
to a place in the Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence. It does so by
constructing a workable animus doctrine, answering critics of the animus
idea, and, finally, contextualizing the animus idea within the broader
sweep of American constitutional law. It performs this work in the hope
that courts—including, but not only, the Supreme Court—will find
themselves willing to deploy animus reasoning when appropriate,
confident that they are applying a doctrinally coherent concept that is
firmly grounded in the aspirations of those who drafted and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Part I of this Article lays the necessary groundwork by briefly
recounting the recent history of the animus concept in constitutional law,
focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on Supreme Court equal protection
decisions employing that concept. Part I presents the current state of play
of equal protection animus before the rest of this Article presents and
considers the objections to and glosses on the idea that scholars have
proffered.
Part II presents those objections and glosses. It begins with the
objections. As noted above, the critiques of animus fall into two main
categories. First, some critics object to animus based on concerns about
the effects on legal and political discourse of courts accusing some
participants in democratic debate of acting at the behest of something as
distasteful as “animus.”29 Some of those same critics also raise a more
practical objection, arguing that it is simply impossible to confidently

28. See id. at 649 (“Kennedy’s opinion [in Obergefell] . . . focuses on the effects that
excluding same-sex couples from the opportunity to marry had on sexual minorities and their
children.”).
29. See, e.g., Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 677 (“[T]he Supreme Court aggravates
the conflict that is often described . . . as the ‘culture wars.’”); see also Calabresi Brief, supra note
18 (“The accusation of animus . . . violates the integrity and aspirations of our shared political
discourse.”); Dan O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27,
40 (2014) (“[A] finding of legislative ‘animus’ is insulting and disrespectful . . . .”); infra Section
II.A (presenting this critique).
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determine whether a given law was enacted out of animus.30 Second,
critics such as Katie Eyer worry that focusing on animus, or identifying
animus as the ratio decendi for the cases Part I identifies, throws equal
protection doctrine onto the wrong track. Professor Eyer worries that the
“animus” label misdescribes those cases and implicitly submerges the
usefulness of standard rational basis review as a tool for emerging social
groups to gain legal vindication for their equality claims.31
Part II then turns to those scholars who have embraced the animus
idea, either normatively or as an accurate description for what the Court
has in fact done. It focuses on Susannah Pollvogt and Dale Carpenter,
scholars who have written thoughtfully about equal protection animus,32
and on Carlos Ball, who has carefully distinguished animus from other
phenomena that might similarly support decisions rejecting particular
instances of discrimination.33 This Part sketches out Professors Pollvogt
and Carpenter’s theories of animus—what it is, how one finds it, and the
significance of a court determination that it exists in a given situation. But
it also notes where Professors Carpenter and Pollvogt’s analysis
potentially fall short.
Part III answers both the critics and the adherents of the animus
doctrine. It begins by presenting a reconstructed animus doctrine that
addresses both how a court should find animus and what an animus
finding should mean.34 This reconstructed doctrine fills in gaps left by
Professor Pollvogt’s evocative but incomplete analysis. Part III then
considers the denigration critique identified in Part II.35 In turn, Part III
explains how this reconstructed picture of animus doctrine relates both to
rational basis review and heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause.36 In so doing, it respectively responds to Professor Eyer’s
concerns about animus’s impact on the understood meaning of rational

30. See, e.g., Calabresi Brief, supra note 18, at 10 (“[T]here is no analogue for attributing
shared, common intent to millions of citizens across the nation who have voted on a myriad of
proposals regarding same-sex marriage.”); see also infra Section II.B (presenting this critique).
31. See Eyer, supra note 22, at 1356 (arguing that, so far, the canon of rational basis review
has “fail[ed] to provide an accurate accounting of the scope and significance of meaningful
rational basis review”); see also infra Section II.C (presenting this critique).
32. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 184 (arguing that animus doctrine is “unappreciated”
and has continuing utility); Pollvogt, supra note 24 (advancing a “comprehensive understanding
of unconstitutional animus”).
33. See Ball, supra note 25, at 641 (examining the role of bigotry arguments and findings
of animus).
34. See infra Section III.A.
35. See infra Section III.B.
36. See infra Section III.C.
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basis review37 and refocuses Professor Carpenter’s explanation of the
mechanics of animus doctrine.38
Part IV concludes this Article by contextualizing the animus principle
in the broader sweep of American constitutional law.39 In particular, it
highlights the similarity between that principle and the nineteenthcentury prohibition on class legislation.40 To be sure, these two ideas
arose in very different historical circumstances. But they aimed at a
similar constitutional wrong: the imposition of burdens on groups—often
disliked groups—for no legitimate public purpose. Understanding the
animus principle as the modern descendant of the class legislation
prohibition helps legitimize the Court’s emerging animus doctrine as an
important part of the Court’s overall Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part IV then considers how Obergefell v. Hodges’
intertwining of due process and equality41 provides an additional point of
comparison between modern Fourteenth Amendment cases and class
legislation cases.42
Part IV ends by returning, for a final time, to the denigration critique.43
This final consideration takes a broader view, and speculates about
whether the entire project of constitutional rights adjudication necessarily
requires some form of the name-calling Professor Smith and others have
found so troubling in animus cases. It considers whether doctrinal paths
are open to the Court that would allow it to decide individual rights cases
without necessarily casting aspersions on those who oppose the rights
claim at issue. It closes by expressing doubt as to whether this is possible.
I. ANIMUS TRIUMPHANT
As the Introduction stated, animus—and equal protection animus in
particular—has emerged as a central concept in American constitutional
jurisprudence. In the equal protection context, animus has stepped into
the void left by the Supreme Court’s abandonment of suspect class
analysis and furnished an alternative approach to analyzing at least some
important equal protection issues. More recently, it has migrated into
other constitutional rights areas.

37. See infra Section III.C.1.
38. See infra Section III.C.2.
39. See infra Section IV.
40. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
41. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17
(2015) (“Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double helix
of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity . . . .”).
42. See infra Section IV.C.
43. See infra Section IV.D.
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A. The Rise of Animus
At the modern Court, animus can trace its foundations to the 1973 case
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.44 In that case, Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, famously stated that “a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”45 Of all of what were to become the canonical
animus cases, Moreno was in many ways the easiest to decide, given the
explicit (if sparse) legislative history reflecting a straightforward desire
among at least some congresspersons to harm a disliked group (“hippies”
and their “communes”).46
Moreno’s seeds eventually bore fruit. A dozen years later,47 in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court held that a city’s decision
to prohibit the establishment of a group home for intellectually disabled
persons in a residential neighborhood violated the Equal Protection
Clause, because it was based on “irrational prejudice.”48 The Court’s
sequencing of its analysis—its preliminary decision denying suspect
class status to the intellectually disabled and its subsequent conclusion
that the city’s decision was tainted by “prejudice”—has led to speculation
that its suspect class analysis somehow set up or provided the foundation
for its animus conclusion.49 Recent scholarship calls that causal
relationship into serious question.50 Nevertheless, even if the connection
was unintended, those two aspects of the decision have been understood,
at least in retrospect, to mark both the end of the Court’s decade-and-ahalf long experimentation with political process-based suspect class
44. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. See id.
47. To be sure, cases before that date repeated Moreno’s warning about the lack of
constitutional justification provided by “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”
Id. But in those cases, the Court found the requisite bad intent missing. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979) (finding that the challenged rule was “[q]uite
plainly . . . [not motivated] by any special animus against a specific group of persons”); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 n.18 (1974) (finding that no “single reference in the legislative
history” of the Veteran Readjustment Benefits Act of 1960 supported appellee’s claim that the
Act was intended to punish conscientious objectors). But see Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White,
J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s finding of no animus, since the heroin addiction
governed by the challenged rule “is a special problem of the poor, and the addict population is
composed largely of racial minorities” and because “[p]ersons on methadone maintenance have
few interests in common with members of the majority”).
48. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986) (characterizing Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Cleburne as describing the majority’s “second order rational basis” analysis
as “occur[ring] in cases in which the law in question approaches, but falls short of, the . . . suspect
classifications usually triggering strict scrutiny” (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458)).
50. See Araiza, supra note 5, at 624.
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analysis51 and the rise of a new approach to equal protection, which
features a more granular approach to equality issues and a willingness to
discredit at least some decisions as being tainted with unconstitutional
animus.
A decade after Cleburne, the Court in Romer v. Evans52 employed this
new approach to strike down, for the first time in the Court’s history, an
instance of sexual orientation discrimination as violating equal
protection. Romer concerned Colorado’s Amendment 2, a voter-enacted
initiative that sought to prohibit any person from stating a claim of
protected legal status because of that person’s gay, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation.53 The Court struck down Amendment 2.54 Taking the next
logical step after Cleburne, the Court concluded that, because it could not
find any rational relationship between a legitimate government interest
and the broad legal disabilities Amendment 2 imposed, animus remained
as the only possible explanation for Amendment 2.55 This step—inferring
animus rather than, as in Moreno, finding direct evidence of it or, as in
Cleburne, finding it as legislators’ endorsement of their constituents’
dislike of the group56—may have been necessary to the Romer Court,
given that otherwise it would face the unpleasant task of explicitly
accusing the citizenry of Colorado of acting out of bad motives,57 based
on a highly speculative inquiry into voters’ motivations.58
51. To be sure, the Court continues to apply the results of previous suspect class analyses.
See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (noting and applying the
previously determined scrutiny level appropriate for sex classifications). Moreover, lower federal
courts, as well as state supreme courts applying their own state constitutional equal protection
provisions, have also continued to apply suspect class analysis to determine the scrutiny level
appropriate for discrimination where suspectness has not previously been determined. See, e.g.,
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
sexual orientation discrimination merited heightened scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 889, 907 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that, under the Iowa Constitution’s equal protection
provision, sexual orientation constitutes a quasi-suspect class).
52. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
53. As the text indicates, Amendment 2 did not speak to sexual orientation more generally,
but instead focused on these particular orientations. See id. at 624 (quoting Amendment 2).
54. Id. at 635–36.
55. Id. at 632.
56. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (noting the trial
court’s finding that the City Council rested its decision in part on constituents’ negative reactions
to the would-be residents of the group home).
57. This concern might have been particularly salient in 1996, when an earlier round of the
gay rights culture wars was in full bloom and when attitudes about homosexuality, while evolving,
could not be fairly described as presumptively welcoming.
58. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 50–52
(2017); see also, e.g., Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 863 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d en banc, 131 F.3d
843 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down a voter-enacted referendum on the theory that the voters were
not adequately informed about the effect of the issue on which they were asked to vote).
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The next step in the progression of animus was expounded only by a
single justice, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas.59 In Lawrence, a five-justice majority voted to strike down
Texas’s sodomy law as violating the due process rights of gays and
lesbians to engage in intimate conduct and, in the process, to overrule the
Court’s contrary decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.60 Justice O’Connor,
who had voted with the majority in Hardwick, relied instead on the Equal
Protection Clause as authority for striking down the Texas law.61 Her
opinion surveyed the cases this Part has discussed up to now, and
concluded that they stood for the proposition that “[w]hen a law
exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down
such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”62 Her synthesis of the
Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy confirmed, first, that those cases were
indeed connected, and second, that their common characteristic—laws
exhibiting a bare “desire to harm a politically unpopular group”—
triggered “a more searching form of rational basis review.”63 Importantly,
though, her brief analysis left open the question of whether such
“searching” review would inevitably lead the law to be struck down or
whether, instead, a law could feature such a problematic motivation and
nevertheless survive judicial scrutiny.
The next case, and the final one to explicitly reference animus, was
United States v. Windsor,64 decided precisely one decade after
Lawrence.65 In Windsor, a five-justice majority held that Section 3 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.66 Section 3
defined marriage for federal law purposes as consisting only of a man and
a woman, with the result that persons in same-sex marriages recognized
59. 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. See id. at 578 (majority opinion) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
61. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. See id. at 586 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). She also observed that strikedowns under that standard were “most likely . . . where . . . the challenged legislation inhibits
personal relationships.” Id.
63. Id. at 579, 580. To be sure, the five-justice majority also used language that suggested
the same concern about the use of law to demean or harm. See, e.g., id. at 575 (majority opinion)
(stating that Bowers v. Harwick’s “continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
persons”).
64. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
65. Compare id. at 2675 (date Windsor was decided), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (date
Lawrence was decided).
66. See id. at 2693.
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by their home states67 would not enjoy marital status for purposes of
federal rights and responsibilities.68 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy began by expressing concern that Section 3 contravened the
normal deference the federal government showed to state-law definitions
of marriage.69 He acknowledged instances where the federal government
had in fact rejected such state-law definitions, but he insisted that Section
3’s omnibus approach, which altered “over 1,000 statutes and numerous
federal regulations,” “depart[ed] from [the] history and tradition of
[federal] reliance on state law to define marriage.”70 As such, it
constituted “[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual character” that merited
“careful consideration” to determine its constitutionality.71
Applying such “careful consideration,”72 Justice Kennedy concluded
that Section 3 did in fact violate the Constitution.73 Citing the legislative
history and even DOMA’s title, he concluded that the law “seeks to injure
the very class New York [the same-sex marriage-recognizing state in
question] seeks to protect” by granting same-sex couples the right to
marry.74 After citing Moreno’s now famous language about “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” he concluded
that Section 3’s refusal of federal marital status to same-sex couples
validly married under their state’s law “is strong evidence of a law having
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.”75 With regard to
purpose, he cited congressional debates, the statute’s title, and even
Congress’s brief as an intervenor as support for his conclusion that that
“interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” was the
statute’s “essence.”76 With regard to DOMA’s effect, he stated that the
law “demeans” same-sex couples and “humiliates” their children.77 Only
in the last paragraph of his opinion did he conclude that the law lacked a
legitimate government interest.78

67. When Windsor was being written, eleven states and the District of Columbia recognized
same-sex marriage. See id. at 2689.
68. Id. at 2694.
69. Id. at 2683.
70. Id. at 2692, 2694.
71. Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2693.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2681, 2693.
77. Id. at 2694.
78. Id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
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The last case in this sequence, Obergefell v. Hodges,79 has a more
ambiguous relationship to animus. Unlike his earlier opinions in Romer
and Windsor, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell did not explicitly
condemn, as grounded in animus, the same-sex marriage bans the Court
struck down; indeed, he described opposition to same-sex marriage as at
least partly grounded in deep-seated religious and philosophical beliefs
he characterized as “based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises.”80 Rather, as Professor Ball explained, Justice
Kennedy focused on the deleterious effects of those bans on the couples
that wanted to get married.81 When combined with his earlier conclusion
that same-sex marriage serves the same legitimate government purposes
as does its opposite-sex counterpart,82 these harms to the plaintiffs’
dignity sufficed to condemn the bans, even though they were supported
by religious and philosophical views that could not be condemned as
illegitimate.
Together, these cases have created the raw materials for a meaningful
equal protection animus doctrine. To be sure, they do not precisely and
explicitly delineate the contours of such a doctrine; indeed, their analyses
of the animus idea are seriously under-theorized. But the Court’s recourse
to animus reasoning in its key equal protection cases involving social
groups that lack suspect or quasi-suspect status establishes the idea’s
importance in modern thinking about equality. As the next two sections
explain, that idea has begun to influence other constitutional rights
doctrines as well.
B. Animus in the Travel Ban Litigation
Since Obergefell, and especially since the inauguration of President
Trump, judicial reliance on the animus concept has continued to expand,
particularly in litigation over the Establishment Clause.83 Specifically,
challenges to the three executive orders issued by the president imposing
temporary immigration bans from several majority-Muslim countries
79. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
80. Id. at 2602.
81. See Ball, supra note 25, at 649 (“Kennedy’s opinion [in Obergefell] does not focus on
questions of intent or animus; instead, it focuses on the effects that excluding same-sex couples
from the opportunity to marry had on sexual minorities and their children.”).
82. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–602 (identifying four social purposes served by the
institution of marriage and concluding that same-sex couples seeking to marry sought to serve
those purposes as much as opposite-sex couples).
83. This is not to say that recent lower court decisions have not applied the animus concept
to equal protection challenges beyond claims of sexual orientation discrimination. They have. See,
e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1210–11 (D. Idaho 2015) (striking
down Idaho’s “ag-gag” law as based on unconstitutional animus), aff’d in part and rev’d in part
sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2018).
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featured claims that those orders violated the Establishment Clause
because they reflected anti-Muslim animus.84 Those challenges enjoyed
a fair degree of success,85 until the Supreme Court rejected them in June
2018.86
While the ultimate fate of animus-based Establishment Clause
challenges to these orders is now known, their successes in the lower
courts—and, indeed, in gaining four votes at the Supreme Court—
remains striking. Those orders rested on normally powerful arguments
for judicial deference, given the national security foundation for the
Administration’s argument87 and the President’s broad power under
immigration law.88 Nevertheless, courts probed those orders’ national
security bona fides89 and statutory foundation, and in the course of those
investigations they credited as probative of such animus statements made
not just by President Trump after his inauguration, but also by candidate
Trump (and his campaign aides, advisors, and spokespersons) during
2015 and 2016.90 Courts’ willingness to pierce these various veils
suggests the depth of their commitment to a vigorous judicial response to

84. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 557–59 (D.
Md.) (finding such animus, and concluding that it amounted to a violation of the Establishment
Clause’s requirement that government action impacting religion have a primarily secular
motivation), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017). See generally McCreary Cnty v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864
(2005) (stating that a secular purpose must not be “merely secondary to a religious objective”).
85. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 256–57 (4th Cir.)
(striking down one of these executive orders as motivated by anti-Muslim animus), vacated, 138
S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591, 601 (4th Cir.)
(same), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Haw.),
vacated, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.) (same), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 557–59 (same); Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136–39
(D. Haw. 2017) (same); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 737 (E.D. Va. 2017) (same); see
also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 627 (D. Md. 2017) (finding
the third executive order not to have expunged the anti-Muslim animus of the previous order, and
striking it down on that ground), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018). But see Sarsour v. Trump, 245
F. Supp. 3d 719, 739–40 (E.D. Va. 2017) (rejecting the anti-Muslim animus argument).
86. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
87. But see Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 562–63 (rejecting the
national security rationale as secondary to the anti-Muslim animus rationale, despite the deference
owed to the President’s judgments about national security).
88. But see Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 769–82 (9th Cir.) (concluding that challengers
to the second executive order had a high degree of probable success on their argument that the
executive order exceeded the power Congress delegated to the President under the Immigration
and Nationality Act), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
89. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2404–23 (setting forth the national security vetting
process and noting the nuances the challenged order eventually included).
90. See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1136–37.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4

170

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

plausible claims of animus-based government action.91 Challengers to
those orders looking for a silver lining in their Supreme Court loss can
thus at least take heart from the judiciary’s willingness to probe the
government’s motivations to some appreciable degree.
C. Animus in the Free Exercise Clause
The Court’s 2017–2018 term also witnessed the deployment of the
animus idea in the context of a Free Exercise Clause challenge to the
application of a state public accommodations law. In Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a seven-justice
majority vindicated the claim of a baker who challenged, on free exercise
grounds, the application of Colorado’s public accommodations law to his
refusal to provide a same-sex couple with a wedding cake.92 As
presented, the case posed a foundational conflict between the
government’s interest in ensuring equality for LGBT people, via their
statutory protection under many states’ public accommodations laws, and
the rights of some people of faith to refuse to associate with same-sex
marriage on religious grounds—an association that such persons often
view as complicity in sin.93
Despite these weighty stakes—or perhaps because of them—the Court
issued a very narrow ruling in Masterpiece. The Court, speaking through
Justice Kennedy, found for the baker on the ground that the baker’s
religiously motivated claim for an exemption from the state law was not
treated with the same respect that other such exemption claims received.94
Instead, Justice Kennedy concluded that “[t]he Civil Rights
Commission’s treatment of [the baker’s] case has some elements of a
clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that
motivated his objection.”95 In particular, he cited comments made by state
agency adjudicators tasked with hearing the couple’s discrimination
claim that, according to Justice Kennedy, expressed their disdain for
religiously motivated discrimination of the type in which the baker was
engaging.96 Justice Kennedy also found fault in the commission’s

91. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 572 (stating that the challenged
executive order “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”).
92. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018). For a detailed analysis of Masterpiece animus
analysis, see Leslie Kendrick and Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 133 (2018).
93. See id. at 1732.
94. See id. at 1730.
95. Id. at 1729.
96. See id. at 1729–30.
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allegedly more favorable treatment of other bakers’ secular-based claims
for exemptions from the law.97
For Justice Kennedy, these features of the record of the administrative
adjudication of the baker’s liability under the state’s public
accommodations law reflected a “hostility to a religion or religious
viewpoint.”98 Importantly, in scrutinizing that record for that “hostility,”
Justice Kennedy relied on his earlier opinion in Church of Lukumi
Babalu-Aye v. Hialeah,99 which itself borrowed from equal protection
jurisprudence that provided guidance for courts seeking to determine
whether a facially neutral law was in fact motivated by discriminatory
intent.100 While Justice Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion in Lukumi,
his borrowing from equal protection jurisprudence gained the assent of
only one other justice.101 Thus, when in Masterpiece he cited and applied
his earlier analysis from Lukumi, Justice Kennedy elevated that
borrowing to the status of an opinion for the Court.102 As this Article
explores, the equal protection/discriminatory intent analysis that Justice
Kennedy deployed in search of animus in Masterpiece will play a
significant role in this Article’s construction of a coherent animus
doctrine more generally.
II. ANIMUS ATTACKED AND EXPLAINED
The success of the animus argument in the gay rights cases since
Romer, and its potential for broader applicability, both in equal protection
law103 and beyond,104 has placed animus at the center of an intense
scholarly debate. Critics of that concept have attacked it from several
different perspectives, while scholars more sympathetic to the idea have
attempted to flesh out its undertheorized components. This Part of the
Article lays out these various arguments and notes their points of
commonality and contention.
A. Animus as “Denigration”
A foundational critique of the animus idea maintains that it reflects
accusations of ill will and subjective prejudice. Expressed most colorfully
97. See id. at 1730–31.
98. Id. at 1731.
99. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
100. See id. at 540–42.
101. See id. at 522, 540–42.
102. See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
103. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1210–11 (D. Idaho 2015)
(striking down Idaho’s “ag-gag” law as based in unconstitutional animus), rev’d sub nom. Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2018).
104. See supra Section I.B.
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by Professor Smith as “the jurisprudence of denigration,”105 this critique
explains such accusations as the natural result of the extreme lack of
social consensus on fundamental questions of liberty and equality in
modern American society. Professor Smith argues that, given such
dissensus, accusations of this sort become the only potential point of
social consensus left—namely, that acting out of “prejudice” or “animus”
is unquestionably wrong.106 Relatedly, he suggests that a jurisprudence
founded on a search for such bad motives reflects courts’ limited
competence, and, in particular, their inability to employ other types of
reasoning methods, such as straightforward moral reasoning.107 The
problem, he argues, is that labelling conduct as animus-based does
nothing to establish that, as a matter of such consensus, the conduct is
indeed generally considered to be wrong.108
The results of such a jurisprudence are, to Smith and others of like
mind, predictably bad.109 Given that the subjects animus doctrine
addresses often reflect deep-seated cultural anxieties—for example,
about sexuality and gender identity—but also situations, such as that in
Cleburne, where citizens feel other types of deep-seated unease with the
group they are trying to segregate, it is easy for one side of the battle to
lob accusations that the other side is acting out of “prejudice,”110
“animus,” or “a bare . . . desire to harm . . . .”111 According to Professor
Smith, those accusations, combined with the nature of the underlying
issues, simply poison the dialogue and compromise that he views as
necessary exactly because of the deep-seated and incompatible nature of
the views held by each side.112
105. See Smith, Denigration, supra note 17.
106. See Steven D. Smith, Against “Civil Rights” Simplism: How Not to Accommodate
Competing Legal Commitments, in UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO SCH. OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 3, 4 (Research Paper No. 17-294, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2991883 [https://perma.cc/QXD8-KZXX] [hereinafter Smith, Simplism]; Smith,
Denigration, supra note 17, at 690–96; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 644 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human
being or class of human beings.”).
107. See Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 696–97.
108. See id. at 691 (“No citations should be needed for the proposition that on many concrete
moral questions—particularly but surely not exclusively in the realm of sexual morality—
Americans disagree radically; what some Americans view as profoundly wrong, other Americans
regard as wholly acceptable and sometimes even virtuous.”).
109. See, e.g., Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 700 (“It is hard to imagine a
jurisprudence better calculated to undermine inclusiveness, destroy mutual respect, and promote
cultural division.”).
110. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short of it is
that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice . . . .”).
111. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
112. See Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 700.
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Professor Smith is not alone in his bleak assessment of the
consequences of court decisions grounded on an animus theory. For
example, in 2014, an ideologically diverse group of legal scholars took
the unusual step of submitting, in a pre-Obergefell same-sex marriage
case, an amicus brief urging the Court to grant certiorari but arguing only
that the Court should “correct” lower courts’ alleged over-emphasis on
the animus aspect of its decision in Windsor.113 These scholars’ negative
focus—that is, their desire simply to have the Court retreat from the
animus aspect of Windsor (or to “correct”114 lower courts’ alleged overemphasis on it)—appears to have flowed from their concerns about the
implications of a conclusion that the same-sex marriage bans then at issue
were grounded in animus. According to the scholars, such a conclusion
“impugn[ed] the motives”115 of the voters who enacted voter initiatives
banning same-sex marriage.
Such “impugning,” these scholars argued, would generate negative
social effects.116 They argued that it would widen social strife on a deeply
contested cultural issue, which in turn would make it more difficult for
the anti-same-sex marriage side to accommodate itself to an adverse
result.117 The scholars also implied that the bitterness of such a defeat—
and, conversely, the unambiguous moral high ground that the marriage
rights forces would hold in the aftermath of an animus-grounded judicial
triumph—would make it difficult to forge a post-marriage war
compromise between public marriage rights and private conscience
rights.118
These arguments also imply a deeper critique. Made most explicitly
by Professor Smith,119 this critique suggests that the animus idea reflects
a type of “Manichean”120 thinking that divides the world into saints (who
reject views labelled as animus-driven) and sinners (who embrace such
views). The critique maintains that such binary thinking not only renders
113. See Calabresi Brief, supra note 18, at 2–3.
114. See id. at 2.
115. Id. at 4–5.
116. Id. at 5.
117. See id. at 13–16; see also Smith, Simplism, supra note 106, at 8 (“The targets of such
accusations—namely, those who are denigrated by distant outsiders as disingenuous and hateful
even though they themselves know otherwise—are of course likely to feel resentful, abused, and
alienated. Justified or not, these perceptions do not contribute to a healthy, positively engaged
civic character.”).
118. See Calabresi Brief, supra note 18, at 13–16. For a statement that arguably illustrated
their concerns, see Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensivecrouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/EH7D-RLCX].
119. See Smith, Simplism, supra note 106, at 8–9.
120. See id. at 8.
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impossible both compromise and post-war peace on the particular issue
in question, but also undermines the foundations of democratic
deliberation more generally by failing to recognize that fellow citizens
have worldviews and motivations that merit respect, even if that respect
takes the form of respectful disagreement.121 Indeed, even the “saints’”
own self-image undermines the possibility of deliberation, given how
such a distorted self-image makes self-knowledge impossible, or at least
much harder to achieve.122 Such “self-delusions”123 render similarly
unlikely the possibility of empathy with others’ views—not just on a
given issue, but as a general matter. Regardless of their origin, the results
of such polarized absolutism are obvious to anyone who follows political
discourse in America today.
B. Animus as Unknowable
On a far more prosaic note, scholars have also remarked on the
difficulty of discerning when animus exists. This concern manifests itself
most clearly in cases where the challenged action in question takes the
form of a voter initiative, such as Amendment 2 in Romer or the samesex marriage prohibitions that were enacted in the late 1990s and the
2000s.124 In such cases, scholars insist on the fundamental unknowability
of the motivations of a large and diverse group of voters passing judgment
on a morally-fraught issue that might be rife with implications from a
variety of perspectives, both practical and purely expressive, some
obvious, some suspected, and others unpredictable.125
But concerns about legislative motivation extend beyond the context
of voter-enacted initiatives. The question of legislatures’ motivations—
whether they can be uncovered and if so, how and with what doctrinal
effect—has occupied scholars and courts for over a generation.126 Nor
have courts been consistent on this question. Indeed, from remarking on
121. But see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 31
(1996) (arguing that certain preferences should not be accounted for and respected in government
decision-making because they reflect desires to oppress other groups).
122. See Smith, Simplism, supra note 106, at 9.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996).
125. See Calabresi Brief, supra note 18, at 9–13; see also Smith, Simplism, supra note 106,
at 7 (“[A]rguments that centrally turn on ascriptions of animus to large classes of people are likely
at best to vastly oversimplify a complex set of beliefs, perspectives, and motivations . . . .”).
126. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100–01 (1980) (arguing legislators may be susceptible
to making decisions that benefit their own interest, but the Constitution is meant to prohibit that
bias).
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the difficulty of determining such intent in 1968127 and flatly declaring
the impossibility of that task three years later,128 the Court enshrined a
closely related concept, “discriminatory intent,” as a threshold equal
protection requirement in 1976.129 When combined with what is alleged
to be the high-stakes nature of a finding of a particular type of intent—
that is, “animus”130—this epistemological difficulty would seem to send
a strong cautionary signal about widespread use of the animus idea.131
C. Animus as Incomplete and Misleading
Katie Eyer criticizes the animus idea from a very different
perspective. Critiquing what she describes as “the canon of rational basis
review,”132 she argues that animus “fail[s] to provide an accurate
accounting of the scope and significance of meaningful rational basis
review.”133 Professor Eyer’s project seeks to unearth and display the
phenomenon of rational basis review that is—to use her term—
“meaningful,” with the goal of demonstrating the utility of garden-variety
rational basis arguments to emerging social movements seeking
recognition of their equality claims.134
Eyer does not deny that rational basis review often takes the ultradeferential form reflected in well-known cases135 such as Railway
Express v. New York136 and Williamson v. Lee Optical.137 But she argues
that such review can also be more searching; indeed, she claims that
courts have often employed a more searching variety at the behest of
social movements.138 Professor Eyer’s project aims at revealing this
additional facet of rational basis review in order to ensure that future
litigators learn the potential usefulness of making rational basis claims,
both to win victories simpliciter and to help encourage a judicial and
extra-judicial conversation about that particular type of equality claim,

127. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84.
128. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25.
129. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
130. See supra Section II.A.
131. See, e.g., Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 92, at 148 (noting this epistemological
problem).
132. Eyer, supra note 22, at 1320. Eyer also critiques descriptions of some instances of
rational basis review as distinct from, and explicitly sharper than, its traditional version. See id. at
1356–58.
133. Id. at 1356.
134. Id. at 1321.
135. Id. at 1367.
136. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
137. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
138. See Eyer, supra note 22, at 1320.
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with the goal of achieving more explicit judicial and political
protection.139
Eyer argues that a focus on animus impairs this archeological project
by segregating cases described as animus cases, distinguishing them from
“normal” rational basis cases, and thus reducing their usefulness as
models for rational basis review.140 She also expresses concern that the
animus category tells a misleading story of constitutional change, since,
as she observes, emerging social movements rarely find early success in
having discrimination against them struck down as animus-based.141
Rather, Professor Eyer argues that just as with the denomination of a
group as a suspect class, the denomination of a particular type of
discrimination as animus-based at best describes a more advanced stage
of the group’s campaign for recognition.142 Neither suspect class status
nor rejection of such discrimination as animus-based springs fully formed
at the start of that group’s constitutional litigation saga.143 Her project,
therefore, seeks to fill in that early gap, which almost necessarily implies
a critique of the entire idea of an “animus doctrine.”
D. Animus Distinguished and Explained
A different group of scholars view the animus concept more
favorably. While they differ in the details, these scholars agree that the
animus concept merits a place in the Court’s equal protection doctrine.
However, they suggest, in one way or another, cabining the doctrine or
structuring it in a way that provides it with the soundest foundation
possible.
1. Animus Distinguished
One approach to animus cautions that it should not be appealed to as
an all-purpose tool to challenge any particular type of discrimination. A
leading example of this approach is Carlos Ball’s attempt to explain that
Obergefell did not accuse same-sex marriage opponents of bigotry or
animus.144 Professor Ball notes that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
focused on the demeaning effects of same-sex marriage bans on the samesex couples who wished to marry, and on their children.145 Since,
according to Justice Kennedy, same-sex couples wished to marry for the
reasons that society generally valued marriage, a state’s decision to “lock
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id. at 1358–59.
Id. at 1358.
Ball, supra note 25, at 648.
Id. at 649.
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[gays and lesbians] out of a central institution of the Nation’s society”
“has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important
respects” and “demeans” them.146 But Professor Ball notes that Justice
Kennedy went out of his way to acknowledge the honorable foundations
for much religious and philosophical opposition to same-sex marriage.147
From analysis such as this, Professor Ball concludes that Obergefell did
not accuse same-sex marriage opponents of bigotry.148
Much of the impetus for Professor Ball’s careful analysis seems to
have stemmed from the Obergefell dissents, which accused Justice
Kennedy of leveling exactly this charge against same-sex marriage
opponents.149 But the import of his analysis extends beyond Obergefell
and, indeed, beyond gay rights. Professor Ball’s analysis warns us that a
doctrinal tool such as animus cannot be applied uncritically to any
instance of discrimination against a given group, even when a particular
prior instance has in fact been condemned as grounded in animus. In other
words, he cautions that animus cases such as Windsor (which he
applauds) must sometimes be distinguished—even when, as in
Obergefell, the same type of discrimination is challenged in a later
case.150
This lesson is an important one. Within the ambit of gay rights, and
indeed even same-sex marital rights, cases have already arisen that
consider the limits of same-sex marriage opponents’ rights to refuse to
associate with or endorse such ceremonies (and potentially such statuses),
either in their public or private capacities.151 Most notably, Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, discussed earlier,152
considered the extent of a baker’s free speech and free religious exercise
rights to decline to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage
celebration. The Court’s narrow resolution of that case makes it highly
likely that further litigation will arise to flesh out the meaning of the
Court’s decision and, more generally, the balance between statutory
equality rights and statutory or constitutional religious exercise rights.
146. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
147. See Ball, supra note 25, at 650.
148. Id. at 651.
149. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2630 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
150. See Ball, supra note 25, at 642–46.
151. In their public capacities, such refusals might take the form of government officials
refusing to assist in the solemnizing of a wedding. See, e.g., Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Can LGBT
Rights and Religious Rights Co-Exist? Kim Davis-like Case Test the Waters, WASH. POST (Feb.
7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/02/07/can-lgbt-rightsand-religious-rights-coexist-kim-davis-like-case-tests-the-waters/?utm_term=.689306465a2b
[https://perma.cc/5H45-ANGN].
152. See supra Section I.C.
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Professor Ball’s caution about uncritical application of the animus
principle tells us that such follow-up litigation—as well as other types of
discrimination claims that will likely be made in the future 153—must be
analyzed carefully so that animus can only be applied when that principle
truly applies to the facts of the given case.154
2. Animus Explained
A final set of scholars explicitly defend the anti-animus principle as a
legitimate component of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Most
notably, Dale Carpenter and Susannah Pollvogt have each carefully
analyzed the canonical animus cases and erected doctrinal structures that
seek to define animus and guide courts presented with animus claims.
Their analyses and resulting structures have done a great deal to advance
our understanding of the concept of unconstitutional animus. But each
leaves important questions unanswered.
Professor Carpenter’s analysis of animus comes in defense of the
Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, the case in which the Court
struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act. 155 Revealingly
titled “Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus,” his analysis
attempts to connect the Court’s canonical animus cases with its Carolene
Products-based theory justifying more careful judicial review as an
appropriate response to political process breakdown.156 Moving from
such high theory to practicalities, Professor Carpenter concludes his
analysis by articulating a set of factors that help determine when animus
exists and by applying those factors to DOMA.157
Carpenter’s analysis is important at both the level of theory and
doctrinal practicality. His analysis connecting the anti-animus principle
to concerns about political dysfunction reinforces a further linkage
between that principle and the framing generation’s concern with
faction.158 This latter linkage is important because it contextualizes
animus within the broader sweep of American constitutional law. In turn,
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176–77 (D.D.C. 2017) (issuing
preliminary injunction against application of President Trump’s order denying transgendered
persons the right to serve in the military), appeal dismissed, No. 17-5267, 2018 WL 411236 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 4, 2018); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 92, at 148 (observing that the Court
in Masterpiece “adopt[ed] a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determining whether
officials have acted with animus” and expressing their agreement with that approach).
155. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 191.
156. See, e.g., id. at 226 (“Animus doctrine addresses the deeply problematic potential of a
democratic republic to consistently oppress a politically unpopular minority, a concern articulated
in Carolene Products.”).
157. Id. at 221.
158. See id. at 226–30.
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such linkage helps make the case for animus as a legitimate component
of modern equal protection law. In addition, his identification of practical
criteria for determining the existence of animus in a given case helps
provide a set of workable guideposts for courts considering claims of
unconstitutional animus. Given the critique of animus as little more than
pejorative name-calling,159 the creation of a workable and objective
doctrinal structure to assist in unmasking animus promises to aid courts
when they consider whether animus constitutes a suitable judicial tool
rather than simply a political cudgel.
Nevertheless, Carpenter’s analysis is incomplete and in some ways
flawed. It is incomplete in that it does not attempt to explicitly connect
the animus principle with the nineteenth-century concept of class
legislation,160 which itself was a direct descendant of the framers’
concerns with faction, which Carpenter does mention.161 It is also
flawed—or at least slightly misfocused—in its equation of purposeful
discrimination in more traditional equal protection contexts (such as race)
with the purposeful discrimination that constitutes animus. These more
problematic aspects of Professor Carpenter’s construction of an animus
doctrine require a doctrinal structure that is more fully fleshed-out and
sharply focused.
Susannah Pollvogt has also written thoughtfully about both the
general concept of animus162 and, more specifically, on some of the
canonical animus cases.163 In particular, she has concluded—correctly—
that animus can be evidenced both by explicit legislative statements and
as “an inference . . . based on the structure of a law.”164 She also
concludes—again correctly—that animus must be understood as a per se
constitutional wrong rather than, say, as a trigger for heightened scrutiny

159. See Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 696.
160. Carpenter does make one brief reference to the anti-class legislation impetus for the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 229–30. But he does not provide an indepth analysis of class legislation doctrine or its connection with the animus principle.
161. See, e.g., HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 19–60 (1993) (drawing the connection between
the framers’ concern about faction and the subsequent generation’s concern about class
legislation).
162. See generally Pollvogt, supra note 24 (arguing animus analysis is a good alternative to
tiered scrutiny analysis for Equal Protection claims).
163. See generally Susannah Pollvogt, Forgetting Romer, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 86, 89
(2013) (critiquing the Court’s analysis in Romer as “incomplete and ultimately incoherent”).
164. Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 926.
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of some sort.165 As she colorfully puts it, animus “functions as a doctrinal
silver bullet.”166
Nevertheless, Pollvogt’s analysis, like Carpenter’s, is incomplete. She
reads several of the important animus cases as requiring an “affirmative
connection” between the trait at issue and the government interest.167
Similarly, she reads those cases as reflecting “skepticism of class-based
legislation.”168 But her justification for such skepticism and for the
judicial demand for such an “affirmative connection” remains hazy. At
times, she suggests that such scrutiny is triggered by the status-based
nature of the discrimination.169 But this surely proves too much, as Justice
Brennan acknowledged at the outset of the suspect class era when he
conceded that the immutability of the characteristic at issue in a
discrimination claim, while relevant to determining the suspectness of
that characteristic, could not serve as an infallible guide to that
determination.170
At other times, Professor Pollvogt uses the language of “caste” and
suggests that laws that create permanent classes are inherently
problematic under the Equal Protection Clause.171 Caste is surely an
important part of the animus idea, as this Article will argue. 172 But
without a theory of what constitutes caste-creating legislation, such
language simply rephrases her identification of status-based
discrimination as especially problematic. Indeed, it suggests that cases
such as Zobel v. Williams,173 in which the Court condemned state laws
because they created permanent classes, should be understood cases
about animus.174 This suggestion is troubling, not because such cases175
165. See id. at 929–30. To be sure, the animus that’s at issue in the cases and in this Article
is animus that furnishes the basis for government action. In other words, this Article—like the law
itself—does not address situations in which a legislature may have animus toward a group but
fails to legislate based on that animus. Thanks to Steven Smith for pointing out this distinction.
166. See id. at 889.
167. Id. at 911, 927; see also id. at 910 (describing the government action in Cleburne as
being struck down “because the trait that characterized [the plaintiff] group had no special
relevance to the government’s purported interests”).
168. Id. at 927.
169. See, e.g., id. (identifying in these cases “a general skepticism of class-based
legislation”).
170. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
171. Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 926.
172. See infra Section IV.B.
173. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
174. See Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 920–21 (suggesting that Zobel should thus be understood
as an animus case).
175. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 55; see also, Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612,
624 (1985) (striking down, as violating equal protection, a property tax exemption limited to
veterans who established residence in the state before a certain date).
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are necessarily wrong, but because characterizing them as cases about
animus expands the concept of animus far beyond its appropriate
boundaries.176 Thus, while her analysis is, like Carpenter’s, thoughtful
and helpful, it leaves important questions unanswered.
III. ANIMUS IDENTIFIED AND PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD
The challenges posed to the animus principle, described in Part II,
require that the doctrine be placed on a firmer doctrinal footing. This Part
seeks to do that work. It begins by offering a practical, workable doctrinal
pathway for courts charged with determining whether animus exists in a
given case.177 This work builds on the foundation provided by Professors
Ball, Carpenter, and Pollvogt, and answers the critique that animus is
unknowable.178 This Part of the Article then expands its scope, first by
considering the doctrinal significance,179 and, in turn, the moral salience
of an animus finding.180 Thus, it responds to the “denigration” critique set
forth in Part II.181 Part III then situates animus within the traditions of
both rational basis182 and heightened183 scrutiny equal protection review.
In so doing, it respectively responds to Professor Eyer’s critique184 and
refocuses Professor Carpenter’s animus analysis.185 With the animus idea
thus properly explained, Part IV considers how it fits within the broader
sweep of American constitutional law.
176. In addition, and intriguingly, Professor Pollvogt identifies Brown v. Board of Education
and Loving v. Virginia as cases that reflect animus, given that the laws in those cases express a
governmental view that some groups are inferior and thus not fit for social interaction. See
Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 915–17. Such laws may indeed reflect such views; indeed, even the
Plessy Court seemed to be willing to strike down the Jim Crow railway law in that case if it had
been convinced that the law sent a message of African-American inferiority. See Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (recognizing this possibility but then concluding that any
such imputation of inferiority was one blacks cast on themselves by reading the law in that way),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1960) (arguing that Plessy did not disagree
with earlier cases’ more forceful statements about the Constitution’s incompatibility with laws
that stamped one group as inferior, but instead merely concluded, mistakenly, that Louisiana’s
Jim Crow railroad law did not stamp African-Americans as inferior). Evaluating this argument
and considering its relationship to other animus-based claims requires analysis that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
177. See infra Section III.A.1.
178. See supra Section II.B.
179. See infra Section III.A.2.
180. See infra Section III.B.
181. See supra Section II.A.
182. See infra Section III.C.1.
183. See infra Section III.C.2.
184. See supra Section II.C.
185. See supra Section II.D.2.
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A. Reconstructing Animus
1. How to Find Animus
The search for animus in any given case challenges courts with
problems that implicate both practicality and theory. At the most practical
level, animus claims confront courts with the threshold question of
whether animus necessarily reflects subjective ill will on the part of the
decision-maker. A requirement that courts identify such ill will would
bode poorly for the doctrine’s future usefulness, for reasons that have
been well-known for decades.186 The institutional nature of most
government action means that the very concept of discrimination
motivated by subjective dislike is of questionable coherence,187 even if
the Supreme Court insists that equal protection plaintiffs show some level
of “discriminatory intent” when challenging facially neutral laws.188
Even more foundationally, the well-known critique that the Court’s intent
jurisprudence has retarded progress toward race and sex equality189
186. See, e.g., Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 92, at 146-154 (discussing the
problem of subjective intent).
187. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens
of Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284 (1992) (“[T]he concept of ‘an’ intent
for . . . an institution [is] hilarious.”). To be sure, some government actions might in fact reflect
an individual official’s choice and thus could avoid this critique. For example, many, though
certainly not all, class-of-one equal protection cases feature allegations of mean-spirited action
taken against the plaintiff by one or more government officials motivated by vendettas against the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Geinosky v. Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012) (involving a class-ofone plaintiff alleging orchestrated harassment by city parking officers who conspired to ticket his
car so continuously that he received tickets for illegally parking his car in different parts of
Chicago at exactly the same time). See generally William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in
Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 498–500 (2007) (discussing lower
courts’ resistance to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562 (2000), that subjective ill will was not a necessary part of a plaintiff’s class-of-one
claim). Similarly, litigation over President Trump’s immigration executive orders involves
allegations that those orders were motivated by the President’s own personal anti-Muslim animus.
See supra Section I.B (discussing this litigation); see also Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note
92, at 146 (“Where a single person has legal authority—for example, the President of the United
States issuing a travel ban—courts can proceed on the plausible assumption that the person
exercises that authority on the basis of some intention (or set of intentions).”).
188. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976); see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (determining that law favoring hiring of veterans does not
demonstrate animus or violate the Equal Protection Clause because “[t]he appellee . . . has simply
failed to demonstrate that the law in any way reflects a purpose to discriminate on the basis of
sex”).
189. In particular, many scholars have criticized the intent requirement in light of subsequent
decisions that have allegedly made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to prove the required
discriminatory intent when challenging actions that burden minority groups without explicitly
classifying on the basis of race. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1080–83 (2011) (critiquing both the intent
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constitutes a warning against an unreflective expansion of that
jurisprudence into the nascent animus concept. As explained below,190
however, equal protection ought to be understood as flexible and nuanced
enough to require some type of bad intent in some contexts (such as
animus itself) while dispensing with that requirement in others.
Relatedly, even assuming that such inquiries are conceptually
coherent, the proof problems that arise when courts attempt to divine such
an intent present formidable problems. Whose statements during the
legislative debate count? How much weight should they carry when a
judge evaluates the entire legislature’s aggregate intent? Can judges
legitimately pierce the veil of ostensibly neutral-sounding justifications
to conclude that some subjective invidious intent lurked below? In
particular, if animus is correctly considered a particularly intense,
subjective frame of mind,191 what is a judge to make of equally
idiosyncratic countervailing evidence? For example, consider the fact
that one of the three Cleburne, Texas city council members who voted
against the permit for the group home for intellectually disabled persons
had sat on the board of a school for intellectually disabled persons, while
another had an intellectually disabled grandchild.192 How, if at all, should
a judge evaluate those facts when determining whether those council
members (let alone the council as a whole) “disliked” or harbored
“irrational prejudice”193 toward the intellectually disabled?
These problems plague equal protection law in general, even if they
may be especially acute in animus doctrine.194 It should not be surprising
then, that the best-known doctrinal phenomenon implicating bad intent—
the “discriminatory intent” requirement most closely associated with
Washington v. Davis195—acknowledges the fundamentally objective
nature of the inquiry.196 Even while using language suggesting human
requirement and what the authors describe as the limited number of evidentiary factors that can
be cited in support of a finding of discriminatory intent); Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2012) (“In declaring that malice is the only form of intent that
counts, discriminatory intent doctrine excludes evidence of continued discrimination against nonWhites rooted in history, contemporary practices, and social science.”).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 318–20.
191. Cf. Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 697 (suggesting that even the inquiry into
discriminatory purpose required by Washington v. Davis implies some level of subjective ill will,
by pairing “discriminatory” with “hateful” purposes); see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 121, at 63
(using similar language to describe a finding that the defendant engaged in intentional
discrimination).
192. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 39.
193. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 191–93 (suggesting this acuteness).
195. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
196. Id. at 241 (discussing the requirement of a discriminatory purpose).
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motivation,197 the Court’s explanation of the discriminatory purpose
requirement establishes that a court can find the requisite discriminatory
purpose by reference to objective factors, including, but not limited to,
the historical background of the decision, the deviation from normal
decisional procedures, and the extent of the disparate impact itself.198
The Court’s explanation of how judges can find discriminatory
purpose can play a useful role in the related area of animus. As I explain
in more detail in other writing,199 the Court’s canonical animus cases,
carefully read, reveal reliance on the factors the Court has identified as
relevant to a contextual200 discriminatory purpose inquiry that turns on
both subjective and objective factors. Moreno featured troubling
legislative history.201 Cleburne featured a decisional process that one
observer described as an emotional and strongly negative constituent
reaction that triggered an after-the-fact legislative search for legitimate
justifications,202 impacting a group the Court acknowledged as at least
somewhat politically powerless.203 Both Romer and Windsor featured
government actions that deviated from the normal substance of the
decision-maker’s conduct in the course of imposing both wide and deep
burdens on a precisely targeted group.204 All of these factors, in addition
to appearing in one or more of the animus cases, were recognized in some
way by the Court as relevant to the more standard discriminatory intent
inquiry in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,205 the 1977 case that provided lower courts with
guidance on the intent inquiry one year after the Court announced the
197. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring that a
challenged law have been enacted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’” its disparate impact on
a given classification tool).
198. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68
(1977) (discussing these and other factors as relevant to the discriminatory purpose inquiry).
199. See generally ARAIZA, supra note 58 (discussing the Court’s animus cases in more
detail).
200. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 189, at 1806–09 (interpreting the Court’s explanation of
its requirement of discriminatory intent in Davis and its explanation of the process of finding such
intent in Arlington Heights as reflecting a “contextual” approach).
201. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); cf. Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 268 (identifying legislative history as a factor in the intent analysis).
202. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 38–39.
203. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
204. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 53–56 (discussing Romer); id. at 67–69 (discussing
Windsor). The second of these characteristics thus echoes, albeit imprecisely, the Court’s
acknowledgement in Arlington Heights that the extent of a law’s disparate impact is relevant to
the discriminatory intent inquiry. See id. at 56–58 (explaining how this “disparate impact” helped
the Court explain why Amendment 2 was unconstitutional in Romer); id. at 67–69 (similarly
explaining how this factor influenced the Court’s analysis in Windsor).
205. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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intent requirement in Washington v. Davis.206 Perhaps one can fairly
dispute the precise correspondence between any of these observations
and its corresponding Arlington Heights factor. Nevertheless, the sheer
number of these phenomena lurking in animus cases, and their conceptual
closeness to corresponding Arlington Heights factors, strongly suggests
that at least as a descriptive matter, the Court’s animus jurisprudence has
built upon the foundational statements of its discriminatory intent
jurisprudence.207
In addition to the parallels one can find between the Arlington Heights
factors and the factors the Court has used in the animus cases, one can
also find a doctrinal parallel in the burden-shifting structure of the two
inquiries. Just as with discriminatory intent analysis, the animus cases,
carefully read, reveal a sequence of shifting burdens.208 Those cases
reveal that, once the Arlington Heights-related factors combine to identify
a plausible claim of animus, the burden shifts to the government–
defendant to justify its decision.209 For example, after the Moreno Court
identified troubling legislative history expressing a desire to punish
“hippies” and “hippy communes,” it proceeded to consider the
government’s proffered interests but rejected them after employing
scrutiny more stringent than is normally associated with rational basis
review.210 Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court began its rationality review
of the city’s decision by identifying, and condemning, the city’s reliance
on its constituents’ fear and discomfort regarding the would-be residents
of the group home.211 It then proceeded to consider the city’s more
legitimate justifications, again subjecting them to scrutiny that has been
rightly characterized as stricter than normal.212 The Court’s other animus
cases feature similar sequences.213
These similarities between discriminatory intent jurisprudence and the
animus cases are not coincidental. As students learn in an introductory
206. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
207. By contrast, scholars have understood the Court’s later statements about the intent
requirement as enforcing a more stringent, malice-like understanding of discriminatory intent,
which necessarily focused more on subjective motivations. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 189, at
1826 (restating this scholarly view and partially endorsing it).
208. See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. Compare Kendrick and Schwartzman,
supra note 92, at 151–54 (criticizing the Court in Masterpiece for failing to perform an analogous
burden-shifting exercise after finding preliminary evidence of animus).
210. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–38 (1973); see also id. at 545–
47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting on the unusual stringency of the Court’s scrutiny).
211. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
212. Id. at 449–50 (scrutiny); id. at 458–60 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (commenting on the unusual strictness of the Court’s review).
213. See ARAIZA supra note 58, at 54–58 (discussing Romer); id. at 69–73 (discussing
Windsor).
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Constitutional Law class, discriminatory intent is the gateway to the
heightened scrutiny that courts perform when legislation classifies on a
suspect ground, either explicitly or (more relevantly here) intentionally.
In turn, that heightened scrutiny seeks to uncover situations where the
challenged law is found to be so tenuously related to a government
interest of the requisite importance that it is held to be invidious. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,214 illustrates
this dynamic: As she famously explained, applying heightened scrutiny
to each and every racial classification “smokes out” those uses of race
that are motivated by what she described as illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or “simple racial politics.”215 To be sure, scholars ever since
Croson have criticized the Court’s insistence that racial classifications
defended as benign run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny.216 But for our more
descriptive purposes, the point is simply that the Court believed that such
scrutiny, preceded by a discriminatory purpose inquiry if required by the
law’s facial neutrality, was necessary in order to reach the ultimate
conclusion about whether the law was invidious.
Animus shortcuts the process of identifying invidiousness. Recall that
the Court has applied the animus idea in cases where, for whatever
reason, it was not willing to apply explicitly heightened scrutiny to the
law in question.217 Thus, in animus cases the tool of heightened scrutiny
is, by hypothesis, unavailable. But the end point of the Court’s review is
the same: In both animus and heightened scrutiny cases, the court
ultimately seeks to determine whether the challenged law reflects
discrimination that can fairly be described as invidious.218 Given that a
similar goal animates both inquiries, it should not be surprising that courts
use similar tools to perform those inquiries.
For the same reason, the parallels in these doctrines’ burden-shifting
structures are also more than coincidental. In the discriminatory intent
context, the burden-shifting occurs when determining whether the law in
question “really” discriminates on the suspect or quasi-suspect ground,
thus opening up the prospect of explicitly heightened review. By contrast,
214. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 493.
216. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”:
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615, 646–47 (criticizing this insistence).
217. See supra Part I.
218. Compare, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded.”), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching
judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”).
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animus becomes a useful doctrinal path for a court exactly when such
heightened review is, for whatever reason, unavailable. Thus, in animus
cases, the burden shifting must, by definition, occur within the domain of
rational basis review. As illustrated by the examples discussed above,219
the animus cases reveal a structure in which judicial suspicion that
animus may be lurking triggers more careful scrutiny of the legitimate
justifications the government offers in defense of the law. In other words,
that suspicion triggers judicial scrutiny that puts the onus on the
government to justify itself. Importantly, though, that more searching
scrutiny occurs under the aegis of the rational basis standard, rather than
either an intermediate inquiry into intent or the ultimate application of
explicitly heightened scrutiny.220
Thus, both the discriminatory intent factors from Arlington Heights
and that case’s burden-shifting structure can do additional duty as
doctrinal components to assist courts in uncovering animus. To repeat,
that’s not a coincidence. The intent-heightened scrutiny sequence and the
animus inquiry both seek to answer the same question about
invidiousness, but the animus inquiry (by definition) avoids heightened
scrutiny. Therefore, it stands to reason that, without explicitly saying so,
the Court has latched on to those same factors—and, indeed, the same
structure for using them—when asking, in the animus context, a distinct,
but closely related question. Use of these factors within the burdenshifting framework that incorporates them helps provide the doctrinal
framework that Pollvogt’s evocative but incomplete explanation of
analysis omits.221
2. The Doctrinal Significance of an Animus Finding
Despite these parallels in the process by which animus and
discriminatory intent are uncovered, the results of these inquiries diverge
in a conceptually significant way. As law students learn, a finding of
discriminatory intent is a pathway to the heightened scrutiny—whether
styled “intermediate” or “strict”—appropriate for the type of
discrimination the intent inquiry has uncovered. But such scrutiny—even
strict scrutiny—is not automatically fatal, as the Court has recognized
when upholding even racial classifications that it concludes are

219. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
220. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 139–43 (explaining that more careful review is performed
in animus cases, and stressing that that review, while seeking the actual reasons for the challenged
government action, nevertheless requires only that the fit be reasonable, rather than particularly
tight, and only that the interest be legitimate, rather than unusually pressing).
221. See supra notes 162–76 and accompanying text (recounting Pollvogt’s analysis).
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sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a sufficiently compelling
interest.222
Animus is different. Unlike a finding of discriminatory intent, a
finding of animus should not trigger further scrutiny; rather, it should end
the case, and end it with a defeat for the government. Because animus
short-circuits the tiered scrutiny analysis, cutting immediately to the
ultimate constitutional question about invidiousness, there is simply
nothing left for a court to consider once it concludes that a law is
grounded in animus. Such a doctrinal structure reinforces the parallel
between animus and nineteenth-century ideas of class legislation, since
class legislation, just like this proposed understanding of animus, reflects
an ultimate constitutional wrong rather than merely an intermediate point
in the analysis, such as a finding of discriminatory intent that then triggers
heightened judicial review.223
Concededly, at first glance, the Court’s animus cases appear
inconsistent with this hypothesis. In Moreno, the famous language about
“a bare . . . desire to harm” appeared early in the opinion, but the Court
nevertheless continued on, to consider the government’s more legitimate
justifications for the law.224 Similarly, Cleburne’s rational basis analysis
began with its disapproving references to neighbors’ fear and dislike of
the would-be residents of the group home but nevertheless continued on
to consider the city’s traffic and flood evacuation rationales for the zoning
permit disapproval.225 Looking back on these cases in her concurring
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor wrote that “[w]hen a law
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down
such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”226 Her phrasing suggests
either that such strike downs are the inevitable result of the scrutiny she
described, or that a law found to be grounded in animus might
nevertheless conceivably survive such scrutiny. The latter possibility
would, of course, be inconsistent with the idea of animus as a per se
constitutional wrong.227 But it is, at least at first blush, what the Court
seems to do.
222. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a law school’s
“narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body”).
223. See generally infra Part IV (explaining the parallels between animus doctrine and class
legislation).
224. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
225. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
227. Cf. Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 889 (describing an animus finding as a “silver bullet”
that is necessarily fatal to any law so described).
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But this inconsistency is more apparent than real. As I have explained
in more detail elsewhere,228 when the Court has pushed forward in its
review of a law even after initially observing its grounding in animus, it
should be understood as endeavoring to ensure that, in fact, animus was
the reason for the law. In a way closely parallel to the standard
discriminatory intent inquiry, suspicion about animus—in Cleburne, for
example, the evidence of the neighbors’ dislike and fear of the would-be
group home residents229—should trigger a demand for proof from the
government that the action was in fact motivated by more legitimate
concerns. Hence, in cases such as Moreno and Cleburne, the Court’s
subsequent examination of the more legitimate concerns asserted by the
government should be understood as constituting a judicial demand for
the government’s actual motivations.
This demand parallels the structure of the intent inquiry, in which a
prima facie showing by the plaintiff that a “bad” intent (say, an intent to
classify on the basis of sex) lurked in the government’s action triggers a
shift in the burden of proof, requiring the government to show that it
would have taken the challenged action even had such bad intent not
existed.230 In both cases, the plaintiff’s success in raising suspicion about
the existence of potentially (or, in the case of animus, conclusively)
illegitimate motivations justifies courts in insisting on proof of benign
motivations. In the context of the discriminatory intent inquiry, this
insistence takes the form of the burden-shifting explained in Arlington
Heights.231 In the context of the animus inquiry, it takes the form of the
more stringent rational basis review that commentators have consistently
noted as a feature of the animus cases.232
B. Responding to the Denigration Critique
The most troubling critique of animus is the one that criticizes the
animus idea as attaching an inappropriately pejorative, ad hominem label

228. See generally ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 120–33.
229. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
230. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977)
(explaining this burden shifting in the discriminatory intent context).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 22, at 1357 & n.178 (arguing that there is “a subintermediate
tier of rational basis ‘plus’ . . . which a litigant must make a special showing to access
(subordinated group status or animus)”). Indeed, rational basis review is ideally suited for the
animus inquiry, since that inquiry’s ultimate concern is not whether the government action
satisfies some level of urgency, as expressed in heightened scrutiny formulas, but instead simply
seeks to determine the government’s real goal. That goal need not be particularly urgent, nor need
the fit be particularly good, as long as the government is acting in good faith to achieve a
legitimate, public-regarding, purpose. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 139–43.
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to laws and their proponents.233 Beyond the fact that an animus
conclusion does indeed necessarily sting, this critique also implicates the
well-known difficulties already mentioned,234 complicating courts’
search for a legislature’s intent.235 Upon reflection, however, both of
these objections can be at least mitigated, if not fully overcome, by
adopting the more nuanced understanding of animus offered above.
One way of mitigating the undoubted sting of an animus conclusion
is to construct an understanding of the concept that does not rely
exclusively on the sort of subjective ill will that scholars such as Professor
Smith find so discomfiting.236 To be sure, this construction process will
not remove the ill-will component entirely. Such an erasure would be
unfaithful to the facts of too many animus cases, which do in fact feature
evidence of simple dislike.237 Just as importantly, it would drain the
concept of animus of its core meaning—in softening the blow, such a
move would eliminate the force of the concept altogether.238
However, there is a way to understand animus as a meaningful
concept that nevertheless eases at least some of the sting. As explained
earlier,239 courts confronting a claim of animus can borrow liberally from
the Supreme Court’s explanation of how courts should go about
uncovering discriminatory intent. That earlier explanation invoked a
variety of factors, most of which avoid requiring judges to delve into the
subjective motivations of government decision-makers. The result of
such an inquiry is thus a conclusion that does not necessarily indict the
subjective motivations of any particular person or members of an
institution. To be sure, being adjudged to have acted with “animus” still
stings, just like being adjudged to have acted, in Professor Smith’s words,
233. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 3, at 237–38 (explaining that religious groups claimed
they felt insulted and attacked in response to the finding of animus in Windsor).
234. See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination:
One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1386–87
(1990) (acknowledging, in the context of commenting on the difficulties courts encounter when
attempting to distinguish between “class prejudice” and “reasonable regulation,” that “the inquiry
into [legislative] motivation is treacherous”).
236. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text; see also Kendrick and Schwartzman,
supra note 92, at 148 (approving of the “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach to animus the
Court took in Masterpiece).
237. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Price-Cornelison
v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008) (involving police selective enforcement
explicitly justified on the ground that the victim of that selective enforcement was lesbian, toward
whom animus was constitutionally acceptable).
238. Cf. supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text (critiquing a theory of animus that
includes within its scope laws, such as the one struck down in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982), that create permanent classes of persons without any imputation of ill will).
239. See supra Section III.A.1.
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with “hateful or discriminatory purposes.”240 But these conclusions can
be shorn of their most pejorative connotations by distinguishing them
from conclusions about subjective motivations.241
At this point the reader may wonder how it is even possible to
conclude that a law is tainted with “animus” without also necessarily
concluding something about the lawmaker’s ill will. On this theory, the
entire idea of animus focuses on ill will, such that it drains the term of
any meaning to apply it to situations lacking such subjective feelings. But
on reflection, it’s not clear why this has to be, at least not in every case.
Institutions, not individuals, enact laws.242 Even though individuals
comprise those institutions (whether a legislature or the public enacting
an initiative measure), discriminatory intent determinations must be made
at the level of the institution, not the individual member—at least when
the challenged action is institutional in nature, for example, the enactment
of a law or the decision of a multi-person governmental body.243 This
240. Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 697; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 121, at 63
(“Stigma is often, and appropriately, inflicted by the law itself—most pertinently, by a legal
finding that a defendant has engaged in purposeful discrimination.”); cf. Black, supra note 176,
at 426 (“Can a system which, in all that can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality,
actually have been ‘equal’ in intent, in total social meaning, and impact? ‘Thy speech maketh thee
manifest . . . ’; segregation, in all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect but that of
inequality.”).
241. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Intent is
not . . . limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law
as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”). To be sure, the Court has rejected this
understanding of intent as a matter of the discriminatory purpose inquiry. See Pers. Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies that the
decision-maker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”). Despite this seeming rejection of the approach stated in the Torts Restatement provision
quoted earlier, the Feeney Court appended to the quoted text a footnote that recognized the role
of more objective evidence of discriminatory intent. See id. at 279 n.25 (“This is not to say that
the inevitability or foreseeability of consequences of a neutral rule has no bearing upon the
existence of discriminatory intent. Certainly, when the adverse consequences of a law upon an
identifiable group are as inevitable as the gender-based consequences of [the law challenged in
that case], a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn. But
in this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a working tool, not a
synonym for proof. When, as here, the impact is essentially an unavoidable consequence of a
legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate, and when, as here, the
statutory history and all of the available evidence affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the
inference simply fails to ripen into proof.”).
242. But see infra notes 265–74 and accompanying text (describing class-of-one litigation);
supra Section I.B (describing litigation against the President’s executive orders on immigration).
243. Of course, individual members’ stated feelings may still be probative of that
institutional intent. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting
legislative history as evidence of congressional intent to act based on animus); U.S. Dep’t of
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must mean that it is the institution’s intent that matters. Even though
individuals’ own subjective intents remain relevant to that institutional
intent question,244 the institutional nature of that inquiry strongly supports
use of objective, institution-focused evidence of the sort the Court has
embraced in the discriminatory intent context.
This same logic should apply in the animus context. As with the
discriminatory intent inquiry, the animus inquiry can rely on a
combination of evidence of lawmakers’ subjective intentions and more
objective evidence, such as the decision’s deviation from normal
practice245 and the extent to which the burden the challenged law places
falls predominantly on an identifiable group.246 But this understanding of
animus does more than simply resolve the problem of subjective
intentions. This objective understanding makes it more defensible to
analogize animus to the Nineteenth century class legislation tradition.
Part IV takes up this work, which holds the potential to ground modern
equal protection law on a firmer historical footing.247
C. Animus and Its Relation to the Rest of Equal Protection Law
So far, Part III has attempted to create a workable animus doctrine248
and has begun considering the moral significance of an animus finding.249
This sub-Part contextualizes this newly created animus structure within
the broader scope of equal protection law. In so doing, it responds both
to Katie Eyer’s critique of animus and Dale Carpenter’s comparison of
animus to intentional race classification. The goal of this sub-Part is to go
beyond the structure of animus doctrine and to begin defending it as a
valuable component of equal protection law.
1. Animus and Rationality Review
Katie Eyer’s critique, discussed above,250 provides the opportunity to
consider the relationship between animus and rational basis review.
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (quoting legislative history as evidence of
congressional intent to act based on animus). In addition, applications of law in particular
situations may still reflect fundamentally individual action. See, e.g., infra notes 265–74 and
accompanying text (discussing the equal protection class-of-one doctrine).
244. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 767–69 (noting the unusual nature of a federal definition
of marriage).
246. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (remarking on the breadth and
targeted nature of the disability Amendment 2 placed on lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals).
247. See infra Part IV.
248. See supra Section III.A.
249. See supra Section III.B; see also infra Section IV.D (expanding on this previous
analysis).
250. See supra Section II.C.
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Professor Eyer’s main critique of animus is limited, though still
important. Her main concern appears to be that identifying the canonical
animus cases as, in fact, animus cases tells a misleading story about
constitutional change.251 At one level, this critique sounds only in
pedagogy: that is, Eyer worries that today’s students, when they become
tomorrow’s social movement litigators, will be dissuaded from making
rational basis claims if they believe (wrongly so, in Eyer’s view) that
rational basis review is inevitably toothless and thus not worth the
effort.252 Rather, she argues, courts sometimes do find that challenged
government action fails rational basis review.253 Just as importantly, such
rational basis victories—and even defeats254—can trigger an evolutionary
process in which courts and the political system eventually come to
accept the equality claims, either by courts ultimately bestowing suspect
class status to the claim or legislatures repealing discriminatory
legislation. Eyer worries that excising the animus cases (which feature
victories for the plaintiffs) from the rational basis canon sends a false
signal to future lawyers that rational basis argumentation fails to yield
such benefits.255
On a deeper level, though, Eyer’s concerns go beyond the
straightforward, though important, question of what we teach our
students.256 Identifying a given case, for example Cleburne, as a rational
basis case, or alternatively, as an animus case matters for the stories
scholars, litigators, and judges tell each other about the development of
the law.257 In turn, those stories matter for the width and shape of the path
lawyers and judges feel is open to them as they move the law.258 Thus,
they matter when a lawyer or a judge decides which arguments can be

251. See supra Section II.C.
252. Eyer, supra note 22, at 1320.
253. Id. at 1319.
254. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969 (2011)
(considering how litigation losses suffered by social movements can ultimately redound to their
benefit, either by mobilizing the movement’s members, triggering more favorable political action,
or even persuading future courts to rule in their favor).
255. Id. at 1320.
256. See generally, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, A Casebook Section Companion to the Canon of
Rational Basis Review (Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086830 [https://perma.cc/QJ2K-FLDX] (providing teaching materials
structured to avoid many of the common problems with the canon of rational basis review
identified in Eyer, supra note 22.)
257. Cf. Araiza, supra note 5, at 665–69 (noting a similar dynamic in the context of the
narrative scholars and judges derive from the text of a case, without regard to the underlying court
dynamics that produced that text).
258. Id. at 666.
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respectably made or vindicated, and which are, to use Jack Balkin’s term,
“off the wall.”259
Professor Eyer’s questioning of how to understand “the animus
cases”—that is, as about animus or about conventional rational basis
review—can never receive a conclusive answer. Those cases can be
framed either way.260 Indeed, Eyer’s larger point—that characterizing
them as “animus” cases harms some larger value beyond simple doctrinal
categorization—is consistent with this conclusion.261 Eyer argues that
characterizing the cases in that way causes such a larger harm by
removing them as exemplars of meaningful rational basis review, and
thus as precedents for future cases where an animus argument might be
difficult to make.262
The dynamic Eyer fears likely exists. But characterizing the Moreno
line of cases as cases about animus generates positive as well as negative
externalities. Most notably, creating a category of “animus cases” helps
rationalize equal protection law by connecting modern doctrine to equal
protection’s anti-class-legislation and anti-caste origins. A full exposition
of this idea must await Part IV, which explains how, properly understood,
animus doctrine hearkens back to the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-caste
aspirations and the ante-bellum class legislation idea on which those
aspirations rested. For now, though, suffice it to say that a properly
understood—and properly limited—animus doctrine helps rescue equal
protection law from a relentless, single-minded focus on the degree of a
challenged law’s fit with a legitimate government interest. To be sure,
that focus has its place—but only as a mediating concept, or heuristic,
that helps judges determine when the equal protection’s core anti-class
legislation goal is satisfied.263
259. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. L.
REV. 549, 577 (2009) (“Constitutional revolutions are changes in expectations about what
constitutional provisions mean and how they are likely to be applied; changes in what kinds of
positions are thought reasonable and unreasonable, ‘off-the-wall’ and ‘on-the-wall.’”).
260. To be sure, it cannot be the case that cases can be framed in any way a commentator
desires. Rather, that framing must respect and comply with the norms of legal reasoning, including
categorization, that obtain at a given point. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 (1980) (recognizing, in the
context of analyzing the standard criteria for suspect class status, that features like immutability
and even identity as a particular group exist only as a matter of social construction rather than
objective reality). But current norms of legal reasoning clearly allow the Moreno line of cases to
be categorized either as “animus cases” or “rational basis cases.”
261. Eyer, supra note 22, at 1321.
262. Id. at 1364.
263. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 811 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges determine when classifications have that
‘fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’ [required by equal protection].”
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971))). In turn, the idea of reasonable classification,
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One fascinating but barely known equal protection doctrine helps
clarify this claim. The “class of one” doctrine, endorsed by the Court in
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,264 holds that a person may be the victim
of an equal protection violation when she is discriminated against, not on
the basis of a shared characteristic such as race or sex, but simply on the
basis of her own identity.265 In Olech, the Court unanimously held that
the plaintiffs—homeowners who were required to provide a larger
easement in exchange for city water service than other residents receiving
the same service—had stated a valid equal protection claim.266 However,
Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment, to express his
disagreement with the per curiam opinion’s conclusion that “ill will” or
“illegitimate animus” was not a necessary part of a valid class-of-one
claim.267 Justice Breyer worried that, without that requirement, “many
ordinary violations of city or state law” would be transformed into
constitutional violations if they lacked a rational basis.268
The class-of-one doctrine, and its relation to core equal protection
commitments, presents a fascinating but intricate issue, the full
presentation of which extends far beyond the scope of this Article.269 For
our purposes, the important point is that, shorn of the animus or ill will
requirement Justice Breyer (and many lower court judges)270 insisted on,
class-of-one litigation devolves into unhelpful and unprincipled
discussions of how irrational a challenged government action has to be in
which finds expression in the “fair and substantial relation” formula Justice Alito recited, can be
traced to courts’ deference to legislative judgments toward the end of the class legislation period.
See V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58
DUKE L.J. 955, 981–82 (2009).
264. 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
265. Id. at 562.
266. Id. at 565.
267. See id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring in the result).
268. Id. In a rational basis case, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), Justice Thomas
criticized the majority opinion for seeming to read an earlier rational basis case as standing for
the same proposition that concerned Justice Breyer in Olech: namely, that unequal state treatment
of an individual based in the state’s misapplication of state law converts that state law violation
into an equal protection violation as well. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 25–28 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
269. For discussions of this doctrine, see generally William D. Araiza, Flunking the Classof-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435 (2013) (analyzing the history and
current state of the class-of-one doctrine and its relationship to the core principles of equal
protection); Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and “Classes of
One,” 89 KY. L.J. 69, 76 (2000) (arguing the original understanding, theoretical underpinnings,
and Supreme Court analysis of the “equal protection guarantee do not support extending the Equal
Protection Clause” to a class of one).
270. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of
the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to Enforce
Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 48–49, 54 (2009).
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order to be held unconstitutional. In turn, those discussions trigger
subsidiary, and equally unhelpful, arguments about the extent of courts’
latitude to indulge in extravagant speculation in order both to identify a
legitimate purpose underlying the discrimination and to find a connection
between that purpose and the personalized discrimination.271 By contrast,
requiring that government singling-out of an individual for burdensome
treatment not be merely irrational, but grounded in animus or ill will,
more firmly plants equal protection law in its anti-class legislation
foundation.272 Indeed, it does so in what is perhaps the conceptually
purest equality context imaginable: claims that a single individual was
the subject of unconstitutional discrimination, based on her own identity
shorn of any constitutionally-significant history of group-based
oppression.
To be sure, in some historically-inflected contexts, most obviously
racial discrimination, “mere irrationality” may indicate a reflexive lack
of concern for the welfare of a group that society has historically
subordinated.273 Such a dynamic can fairly be described as reflecting ill
will, at least to the extent the Constitution charges government with an
obligation of affirmative concern for all members of society. But classof-one claims present situations shorn of such historical baggage and of
any complicating factors related to the status of a particular group, such
as the immutability of its defining characteristic. As such, these claims
present in the starkest possible light the question whether simple
irrationality is enough to condemn such discrimination, or instead,
whether more is required.
By requiring ill will, animus, or at least some level of intentionality in
class-of-one cases, courts would honor equal protection’s core
commitment: that government act in pursuit of a public purpose.274 Note
that the commitment is not that government must succeed in promoting
271. For an analysis of this issue, see generally Steve Sanders, Making it up: Lessons for
Equal Protection Doctrine from the Use and Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage
Equality Litigation, 68 HASTINGS L. REV. 657 (2017) (analyzing the proper scope for judicial
hypothesizing of a government interest).
272. See infra Part IV (explaining this foundation in more detail).
273. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) (discussing the history
of equal protection and racial discrimination).
274. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 2, at 275 (noting this commitment). Of course, it must be
admitted that the Olech Court did not impose this type of requirement on class-of-one claims. See
supra note 265 and accompanying text. But it is striking that many lower courts after Olech
continued to insist that plaintiffs plead such bad intent. See Araiza, supra note 270, at 53–54
(describing this lower court pushback). While some of this pushback might have been based on a
practical desire to cut back on the otherwise-expansive potential of class-of-one claims after
Olech, some of it may have derived from an instinct that class-of-one claims, to be conceptually
coherent, needed to feature some degree of government intent or ill will.
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that interest. Government makes mistakes all the time. But if the
underlying goal of equal protection is that government not act simply
with the goal of burdening any person or group, then in the context of
such “pure” discrimination it makes sense to insist on some degree of
intentionality with regard to the discrimination.
If all this is true—if one core of equal protection’s aspiration, beyond
its goal of uprooting systematic subordination of particular groups, is to
condemn action taken with an intent to burden a group not in the course
of pursuing a legitimate interest but simply in order to accomplish that
burdening275—then a properly understood and properly cabined animus
doctrine can play an important role in bridging the gap between that core
commitment and the fit analysis that characterizes modern equal
protection review and, in particular, rational basis review. Animus
doctrine should not be understood as a replacement for equal protection’s
other, more historically grounded, goals. Most notably, it should not be
understood as a replacement for the Amendment’s historical goal of
ensuring racial equality, however that goal might be understood.276 But
once the focus moves beyond those goals, animus doctrine can play an
important role, both in providing a path forward for considering other
types of discrimination and as connective tissue linking contemporary
jurisprudence to its historical antecedents.
2. Animus and Heightened Scrutiny
As noted in Part II, Dale Carpenter’s inquiry into how courts should
search for animus relies heavily on the Court’s discriminatory intent
jurisprudence that serves as the gateway to heightened scrutiny.277 While
exceedingly helpful, Professor Carpenter’s discussion of animus is
275. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (describing Amendment 2 as “a
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does
not permit”). Tellingly, in the next sentence Justice Kennedy quoted a nineteenth-century case’s
statement that “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24
(1883)).
276. For an example of a scholar arguing that the constitutional uniqueness of racial
discrimination justifies a different balancing of constitutional free exercise and statutory nondiscrimination rights in areas other than race, see Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against
Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBEERTY 231, 252–53 (Micah
Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
To be sure, animus doctrine might have some logical connection with an anti-subordination
understanding of the Amendment’s racial equality goal, in the sense that both animus and antisubordination focus not on classification simpliciter but rather the types of classifications that
reflect problematic government decision-making—respectively, decision-making infected by
animus and (racial) decision-making that fails to account for historical racial oppression. The
scope and details of this parallel present issues that lie beyond the scope of this Article.
277. See supra Part II.D.
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incomplete. His analysis relies on the familiar Arlington Heights
discriminatory intent factors as tools for uncovering animus. 278 That
reliance is unsurprising, and appropriate; as explained above,279 the
concept of discriminatory intent bears close logical and doctrinal parallels
to the animus principle.280
But those factors, and the burden-shifting framework that employs
them, aim at a slightly different goal in the animus inquiry, one Carpenter
does not acknowledge. He writes that, in the race context, “[t]he
impermissible purpose [that is exposed by the Arlington Heights factors]
is the purpose to discriminate on the basis of race,” while “[i]n animus
cases, the impermissible purpose is the purpose to inflict injury or
indignity.”281 His equation of the two relevant “purposes” is off by a
slight, but meaningful, degree. In the race context, the intent inquiry seeks
to establish whether the government was indeed classifying (or
“discriminating”) on the basis of race.282 But establishing that the
government indeed classified based on race (or any other status that
merits heightened scrutiny) does not by itself end the case. Instead, it
merely triggers the heightened scrutiny that the Court has described as
“smok[ing] out” invidious—and thus unconstitutional—uses of race.283
Thus, the intent inquiry plays an intermediate, not a final, step in the
constitutional analysis.
By contrast, use of those same Arlington Heights factors as part of the
animus inquiry leads to a more direct conclusion about the
constitutionality of the challenged action. As Carpenter correctly
acknowledges, animus is itself a constitutional wrong.284 Thus, if
application of the Arlington Heights factors leads a court to conclude that
animus is present, that conclusion—unlike an analogous conclusion that
a purposeful racial classification exists—ends the case.
This may seem like a trivial distinction with little practical bite.
Nevertheless, this distinction matters for two related reasons. First, it
explains the seemingly heightened rationality review that scholars
observe in animus cases. As this Article has explained,285 the conclusive
nature of an animus determination286 means that the burden-shifting that
278. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 243–48.
279. See supra Section III.A.1.
280. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 89–133 (expanding on this point).
281. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 243.
282. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
283. Justice O’Connor (using the “smok[ing] out” language quoted in the text) made this
most clear in J.A. Croson. Id. at 493.
284. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 221.
285. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
286. As Susannah Pollvogt puts it, animus “functions as a doctrinal silver bullet.” Pollvogt,
supra note 24, at 889. See also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 221.
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normally occurs at the second stage of the discriminatory intent inquiry
must occur within the domain of rational basis scrutiny when that scrutiny
is focused on a search for animus. That imperative in turn requires that
such scrutiny be unusually stringent.
Second, and in turn, this understanding of animus as a “doctrinal silver
bullet”287 reveals that animus is qualitatively different from other strands
of equal protection doctrine. In particular, it reveals the animus inquiry
as a doctrinal shortcut, cutting through presumptions and heuristics such
as heightened scrutiny analysis to home in directly on the ultimate
conclusion that other doctrinal paths reach only indirectly. This
understanding of animus therefore reveals the nature of animus as a core
concern of equal protection.
To be sure, this conclusion does not mean that animus properly
supplants those other paths. Applying the anti-animus principle presents
courts with difficult challenges. Indeed, courts apply heuristics such as
tiered scrutiny analysis exactly because more direct inquiries into a law’s
constitutionality tax their abilities.288 But heuristics can also fail or be
abandoned, just as the Court appears to have abandoned any further
evolution of suspect class analysis.289 At such times, a return to first
principles—here, to animus as a modern instantiation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-class legislation idea—can help refocus equal
protection law on its deep foundations.
IV. ANIMUS CONTEXTUALIZED
Part III’s concluding proposition—that animus doctrine can reflect a
reformulated, contemporary expression of equal protection’s historic
aspirations—requires careful consideration. If animus doctrine can be
made to reflect such venerable principles, then it can claim a legitimate
role in American constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, it can even do
more: By presenting a contemporary version of the class legislation idea,
animus doctrine can help reconnect contemporary equal protection law to
its historical antecedents and thus help place that law on a firmer, more
historically legitimate, footing.
The basic argument for this proposition is straightforward: Just like
its class legislation ancestor, animus doctrine tasks courts with ferreting
out laws that are enacted for no legitimate government purpose, and

287. Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 889.
288. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757
(2011) (“At least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence, [the] canon [of suspect
class analysis] has closed.”).
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which are thus fundamentally arbitrary.290 To be sure, “arbitrariness” fails
to fully capture the essence of the constitutional problem with either class
legislation or legislation infected with animus. For example, nineteenthcentury commentators frequently described class legislation using
adjectives that suggested defectiveness, impurity, and corruption,291
words that suggest more than what one might call “arbitrariness,”
“innocent irrationality,” or simple bad fit.292 These more critical
descriptions distantly echo this Article’s earlier argument that
considerations of fit, while important to equal protection law, should play
a secondary role in equal protection analysis—secondary, that is, to
considerations of motive that are closer to the core of the equal protection
guarantee.293
But beyond this straightforward comparison, difficult questions arise
when evaluating whether animus-grounded legislation can be understood
as the modern equivalent of class legislation. The jurisprudential world
290. For a deep consideration of class legislation and its influence on nineteenth and early
twentieth century American constitutional thinking, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1993).
291. Consider, for example, the definitions of “vicious,” an adjective commonly used to
describe class legislation. See, e.g., Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 688 (M.D. Ala. 1903); State v.
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 135 S.W. 773, 774, 776 (Tenn. 1911); see also 2 NOAH WEBSTER,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 882–83 (1828) (“Vicious, . . . 1.
Defective; imperfect; as a system of government vicious and unsound . . . . 2. Addicted to vice;
corrupt in principles or conduct; depraved; wicked; habitually transgressing the moral law; as a
vicious race of men; vicious parents; vicious children. 3. Corrupt; contrary to moral principles or
to rectitude; as vicious examples; vicious conduct. 4. Corrupt; in a physical sense; foul; impure;
insalubrious; as vicious air. 5. Corrupt; not genuine or pure; as vicious language; vicious idioms.
6. Unruly; refractory; not well tamed or broken; as a vicious horse.”); WEBSTER’S COMPLETE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1474 (Chauncey A. Goodrich et al. eds., 1886)
(“Vicious . . . 1. Characterized by vice or defects; defective; imperfect. The title of these lords
was vicious in its origin. . . . 2. Addicted to vice; corrupt in principles or conduct; depraved;
wicked; corrupt; as, a vicious race of men; vicious children; vicious examples; vicious conduct. 3.
Lacking purity; foul; bad; as, vicious air, water, weather, and the like. 4. Not genuine or pure; as,
vicious language; vicious idioms. 5. Not well tamed or broken; given to bad tricks; unruly;
refractory; as, a vicious horse.”).
292. See Araiza, supra note 187, at 509–11 (discussing the differences between animus and
“pure irrationality” in the context of class-of-one equal protection cases); see also Powell, supra
note 2, at 266 (analyzing the applicability of equal protection to “arbitrary or irrational”
government decisions made on an individualized basis). This more precise focus of the animus
idea also effectively brackets the doctrinal question of hypothesized, rather than actual,
government purposes. See Sanders, supra note 271, at 693–94 (discussing the proper scope of
judicial hypothesizing of governmental purposes in constitutional litigation).
293. To repeat a point made earlier, such troubling motivations could also include omissions,
such as failures to give conscious consideration to the interests of particular groups whose
concerns have historically been ignored. See Karst, supra note 273, at 52 (offering such an
understanding of equal protection as a response and partial rebuttal to the imposition of a
generally-applicable discriminatory intent requirement).
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of 1866 is vastly different from ours;294 thus, drawing anything more than
a superficial connection between animus and class legislation requires
revisiting some basic assumptions about equal protection and
constitutional rights in general.295 Still, some tantalizing, if necessarily
speculative and tentative, parallels exist between the class legislation idea
and the anti-animus principle.
A. Class Legislation as Legislation Lacking a Public Purpose
First, consider the core of the class legislation idea. As explained by
Melissa Saunders, the class legislation prohibition condemns laws that
single out particular groups for burdens or benefits without a
corresponding public purpose.296 Professor Saunders offers a thin but
broad definition of class legislation, one that raises the prospect of
encompassing within it laws that reflect not just oppressive intent, but
also laws that reflect “mere” government irrationality or private party
rent-seeking.297
294. Cf. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 263, at 996 (“[A]nalogizing class legislation to
modern political theories poses risks of presentism.”). The same could be said about analogizing
class legislation jurisprudence to modern judicial doctrine.
295. Cf. id. at 1006 (calling for a reconceptualization of equality law as principles guiding
governance so as to ensure that minority interests are accounted for in the legislative process).
296. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 247–48 (1997); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 177 (1988) (explaining how Reconstructionera theorists would have understood that a law that burdened one group without a corresponding
public benefit would be understood as arbitrary). Jack Balkin defines the term to incorporate a
subordinating effect on the burdened group. See Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies
Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 852 (2007) (defining class legislation as
“legislation that imposes special burdens on a social group and tends to perpetuate their
subordinate status”).
297. Saunders disclaims any interest in linking the class legislation idea to any conception
of bad government intent. See Saunders, supra note 296, at 300 (describing the “guidance” of
antebellum class legislation doctrine for the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as a
prohibition “aimed at state action that had the effect of singling out certain classes of persons for
special benefits or burdens”). Her disinterest in the existence vel non of such intent suggests that
a class law’s failure to promote any public purpose must either flow from the law’s sheer
irrationality or its purpose to promote one group’s private interest without any intent to also
promote the public interest. The question of a law’s sheer, but “innocent,” irrationality is an
interesting one. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 2, at 276 (suggesting that the Constitution does not
require rationality where the government exercises “discretion”). The other possibility—that class
legislation reflects nothing but rent-seeking by an interest group—should also be excluded from
animus’s domain, given that rent-seeking laws generally reflect “mere” personal wealth
maximization, rather than aiming at the social subordination of a group. See, e.g., Steven G.
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 n.15
(2011) (describing Saunders’ definition of class legislation as including rent-seeking legislation,
even if, according to the authors, such laws do not impose the “social stigmatization” that marks
caste-creating legislation); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4

202

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

This broad definition of class legislation helps secure a handle on the
proper meaning and role of animus in constitutional law, but it does not
do the entire job. Exactly because this broad definition encompasses laws
that cannot fairly be described as grounded in animus,298 it cannot provide
a precise historical parallel for a properly understood animus doctrine.
Instead, that broad understanding of class legislation suggests that
animus-based laws are best viewed as a subset of class legislation. In
particular, while class legislation, as defined by Saunders, refers to
legislation that lacks a connection to a public-regarding purpose, animus
should be understood as a subset of such legislation that affirmatively
promotes a non-public-regarding purpose.299
B. Animus as Caste Enforcement
The previous sentence offers the prospect of narrowing the
understanding of animus to a subset of class legislation that focuses on
the establishment or reinforcement of castes.300 Scholars have shown that
the idea of caste resonated with the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.301 In rejecting earlier drafts of the amendment that focused
explicitly on racial equality, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
expressed a broader concern with ensuring equal fundamental rights for
all Americans.302 They thus also expressed a corresponding antipathy to
legislation that reduced any group of Americans to a subservient social
position, such as the Black Codes that provided the impetus for both the
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.303 Members of that
the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1024–25
(2013) (defining class legislation as including “legislation that singles out groups, individuals, or
classes of people and grants them special privileges”).
298. See supra note 297.
299. See Saunders, supra note 296; see also Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro,
Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 284, 337 (2015) (describing the equal
protection rational basis test as one that “root[s] out blatant exploitations of power that needlessly
abuse the disfavored constituents or pointlessly reward the favored” and describing rational basis
equal protection cases as “cases in which animus, political capture, and gross violations of public
trust depart from the barest expectations that the government will engage in public-minded
pursuits”).
300. Indeed, some scholars define class legislation in this narrower way. See, e.g., Balkin,
supra note 296 (defining class legislation as “legislation that imposes special burdens on a social
group and tends to perpetuate their subordinate status”). See also Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 926
(connecting the concepts of animus and caste).
301. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 297, at 31–36.
302. Id. at 32.
303. Id. at 31–35. These ideas of equality focused on treating all members of a given class
equally, a fact that opened up significant room for discrimination that modern Americans might
find unjustifiable, if, at the time, the discriminated-against group was thought to be relevantly
different from the favored group. See, e.g., id. at 34–35, 52 (recounting members of the 39th
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Congress used evocative examples from foreign cultures, suggesting that
they understood caste legislation as legislation that imposed status-based
burdens creating or reinforcing a rigid social hierarchy. 304 This
understanding of what the Reconstruction Congress sought to prohibit
makes comprehensible both Justice Harlan’s use of the term “caste” in
his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent as an apt label for laws, like the Louisiana
streetcar segregation law, that were motivated by a belief that blacks were
not fit to associate with whites, and his belief that such laws thereby
violated the Equal Protection Clause.305
The modern animus cases have distinct parallels with the anti-caste
idea. First, all of those cases concerned discrimination based on identity.
To be sure, in Moreno, the identity wasn’t of the type that standard equal
protection doctrine would recognize as immutable.306 Nevertheless, even
in that case, the “bare congressional desire to harm” targeted a social
group based on its distinctive living choices, rather than on identity
attributes society understands as less socially salient, such as occupation
or geographic residence.307
Other parallels also exist, especially with regard to caste’s focus on
creating physical and social distance between groups that in turn
reinforces social hierarchy. Cleburne involved a decision to prohibit the
disfavored group from taking up residence in a particular neighborhood,
a context that distinctly, if admittedly distantly, echoes Justice Harlan’s
critique of Jim Crow legislation as reflecting the majority’s distaste for
associating with the burdened group.308 In Romer, Justice Kennedy
described Amendment 2 in ways that suggested a similar social
Congress stating or assuming that men and women were often different and thus that sex
discrimination often did not amount to class legislation).
304. See id. at 43 (quoting congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment).
305. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555–59 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n view
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here.”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Indeed, Jim Crow legislation itself is certainly susceptible to an allegation of animus, to
the extent it was justified simply by a view that races should not mix. And, as Justice Harlan
recognized via his “[t]here is no caste here” language, it would be even more susceptible to such
an allegation to the extent such laws were justified by the desires of white persons not to associate
with particular types of other people—that is, black people. See id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(setting forth his view of the underlying motivation for Jim Crow laws).
306. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
307. Id.
308. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557; Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL
L. REV. 1211, 1243 (2018) (citing Cleburne as an example of a majority’s desire to create a
physical distance between it and the burdened group). Professor Huq likens this phenomenon to
the idea of “taste-based discrimination” pioneered by Gary Becker, which Professor Huq
identifies as one manifestation of animus. Id. (citing GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 15 (2d ed. 1971)).
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distancing.309 That distancing was more metaphorical than physical, as
the Court concluded that Amendment 2 walled off the burdened group
from the very status of enjoying the protection of the laws.310 But such
metaphorical distancing still resonates as social or civic exclusion:
consider that the last substantive sentence of the Romer opinion described
Amendment 2 as “deem[ing] a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”311
Consider also that Justice Kennedy began his opinion with a reference to
Justice Harlan’s rejection of caste in Plessy.312
Admittedly, Windsor is a tougher fit with the caste idea. Yet even that
case features meaningful allusions to caste. Justice Kennedy noted how
Section 3 of DOMA effected an across-the-board denial of a legal status
that states, the traditional providers of that status, had chosen to bestow
on same-sex couples.313 More explicitly, repeating his emphasis on
dignity in Lawrence v. Texas, he stressed the stigma DOMA imposed,
describing the law as “undermin[ing] both the public and private
significance” of their state-sanctioned marriages, and “plac[ing] same sex
couples in . . . a second-tier marriage” that “demeans the couple,” and
“humiliates” their children.314 These descriptions all suggest the public
subordination of a class of relationships315 that, in turn, reflects caste-like
status.316
309. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
310. See id. (describing the protections Amendment 2 withdrew as “protections against
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society”); cf. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012)) (guaranteeing that all persons would enjoy the same basic
civil rights as enjoyed by white persons). The wording of the statute—not guaranteeing “equal
rights” simpliciter, but rather, guaranteeing that all persons would be accorded the level of rights
protection as that enjoyed by white persons—again suggests, however obliquely, the idea of
raising up all Americans to the highest level of rights protections American law provided, thus
directly attacking the idea of hierarchy.
311. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; cf. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Outlawry,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA (May 4, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/outlawry
[https://perma.cc/RJR9-8SMQ] (describing “outlawry” in terms suggesting social ostracism).
312. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2:
Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 203–04 (1996) (arguing that Amendment 2 was the
equivalent of an unconstitutional bill of attainder).
313. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013).
314. Id. at 2694 (emphasis added). For an argument that such humiliation and stigmatization
constitute the equivalent of an unconstitutional bill of attainder, see Amar, supra note 312, at 208–
09.
315. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (observing that DOMA intentionally created inequality
within the class of marriages recognized by states, the institutions that traditionally bestow marital
status); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–602 (2015) (establishing that samesex marriages further the same societal goals for which marital status is created to begin with).
316. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 683 (2010) (drawing
a connection between majoritarian views that extending marriage rights to same-sex couples will
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These cases’ focus on identity-based physical or social separation
enacted in the service of preserving the purity of the dominant group by
segregating disfavored groups317 suggests an intuitive parallel with the
idea of caste. As such, they suggest that animus doctrine may fit neatly
within a subset of laws condemned as class legislation—those that create
a caste regime.
Of course, animus is not the only equal protection doctrine that
features these parallels to caste. Indeed, given that the anti-caste
imperative provided at least some of the motivation for the Fourteenth
Amendment,318 it is not surprising that many scholars have insisted that
caste-like social subordination should constitute the main focus of equal
protection law.319 The great variety of discrimination that raises colorable
equal protection claims, and in particular the historical legacies of certain
types of discrimination, suggests that an anti-caste and anti-subordination
theory of equal protection should be flexible enough to encompass a
variety of doctrinal mechanisms. With regard to race, for example, such
a theory should easily be flexible enough to accommodate lesser reliance
on an intent requirement in light of the historical embeddedness of racism
in American society that risks leaving much of it unremedied if a plaintiff
is required to satisfy such a requirement.320 One could make a similar
observation about sex discrimination in light of deeply entrenched and
often unacknowledged assumptions about the relative capabilities of, and
appropriate social roles for, men and women.321
For other types of discrimination, however, broad presumptions about
the likely existence of either obvious prejudice or “merely” stereotyped
thinking either become less persuasive or, at the very least, encounter
obstacles to effective judicial implementation. For example,
distinguishing caste-creating discrimination from appropriate differential
sully traditional marriage and notions of disgust and contamination that are heavily casteinflected).
317. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Nussbaum, supra note 316.
318. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 297.
319. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986); Hutchinson, supra note 216, at 692 nn.516–17 (citing
several of those scholars); id. at 692 (“[A]ntisubordination theory looks toward ending only those
governmental practices that reinforce caste.”).
320. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 273, at 30.
321. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 136 (2010) (noting Justice Blackmun’s apparently
startled reaction to Justice Brennan’s suggestion in his draft opinion in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) that the male widower-father in the case might have chosen to stay at home
with the couple’s child even if his wife had not died). For statements about the caste-like status
of gender relations in the United States at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment,
see Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 297, at 57–60.
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treatment may be difficult in the context of disability discrimination.322
In the context of transgender rights, the still-evolving nature of public
opinion may make some judges nervous about issuing blanket
condemnations of such discrimination—a phenomenon that some might
even continue to ascribe to the context of gay and lesbian rights.323
Of course, some axes of discrimination have yet to arise, or yet to
command significant public and judicial attention.324 Indeed, to the extent
majorities can impose social subordination based on the lifestyle choices
of the burdened group,325 the constantly evolving nature of such choices
means that new axes of subordination will likely arise with the living
choices made by each new generation. Even assuming that society
eventually condemns such emerging discrimination, the process by which
that condemnation develops takes time and proceeds in a series of
somewhat regular stages, as scholars have begun to uncover.326
In situations like these, animus doctrine can play a useful role in
ferreting out, at a more granular level, the kind of socially subordinating
discrimination the Reconstruction generation would have characterized
and condemned as caste-creating. But this promising possibility requires
doing the hard work of uncovering the retail-level analogues to the
wholesale legacies of racism and sexism that make anti-subordination an
attractive approach to equal protection in those latter contexts.
The outline of an animus doctrine provided earlier in this Article327
furnishes guideposts for that inquiry. Its focus on legislation that imposes
unusually-targeted burdens that deviate from normal governmental
practices and procedures, and that does so against a background that
suggests that these effects were intended (rather than mere by-products
of legislative attempts to pursue other, more legitimate, goals) channels
322. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444–45 (1985)
(observing that some disability differentiation may in fact redound to the benefit of disabled
persons and expressing doubt about courts’ ability to distinguish between beneficial and
detrimental treatment).
323. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–07 (2015) (addressing the argument
that more public debate was necessary on the question of same-sex marriage).
324. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional
Power to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. ST. L. REV. 451, 478–80, 524–28 (2010)
(discussing the prospect of discrimination based on genetics, and how such discrimination fits
within equal protection doctrine); see also id. at 529–30 (discussing obesity discrimination). See
generally ANA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD (2008)
(providing a deeper discussion of obesity discrimination).
325. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing legislators’ hostility to the
lifestyle choices of hippies).
326. Among the large literature in this area, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2062, 2073 (2002).
327. See supra 215–67 and accompanying text.
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the inquiry toward laws that appear to have been enacted simply to
legislate inequality.328 To be sure, such suspicion does not equate to
proof. But, as that outline explains, it justifies reversing the normal
presumption of constitutionality accorded government action, and it
requires the government to demonstrate that the law was in fact motivated
by a legitimate purpose.
Unlike formally heightened scrutiny, this burden shifting does not
require the government to demonstrate an unusually good fit between the
law and that legitimate purpose. Given that the inquiry’s goal is
determining the government’s ultimate motivation, and given that, by
definition, the discrimination in question is not entirely suspicious, it
demands only a reasonable fit.329 But it must be a fit with the
government’s actual goal.330 This insistence on identifying a challenged
law’s actual goal reflects animus doctrine’s underlying concern with the
government’s motivation.331 If the challenged law fails the burdenshifting described above,332 then the government’s true motive becomes
apparent. And it isn’t good.
C. Obergefell: The Doctrinal Promiscuity of the Class Legislation
Prohibition and the Future of Animus Doctrine
Obergefell v. Hodges333 is the most recent gay rights victory at the
Court—and, more importantly, the Court’s most recent significant
individual rights case that cannot be fully explained by conventional
equal protection or due process doctrine. As such, it provides clues to
animus doctrine’s possible evolution and, in particular, its relationship to
Fourteenth Amendment equality and liberty.
Consider that relationship: Late nineteenth and early twentieth
century-judges and scholars frequently commented on the overlap
between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. That overlap
328. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[Amendment 2] is a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”).
329. For an expanded discussion of this point, see Araiza, supra note 58, at 139–43. Indeed,
to the extent a requirement of precise fit is itself a decisional heuristic that flows from the
identification of the classification as suspect, see, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,
802, 811 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help
judges determine when classifications have that fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation [that equal protection requires].”) (internal quotation omitted), the more direct,
unmediated nature of the animus inquiry dispenses with this requirement in favor of a more direct
inquiry into the law’s constitutionality. See Araiza, supra note 58, at 139–43.
330. On the question of actual versus hypothesized government purposes, see Sanders, supra
note 271, at 695.
331. See ARAIZA, supra note 58, at 139–43.
332. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
333. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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manifested in the prohibition on class legislation, which nineteenthcentury courts often described as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment
as a general matter, without bothering to further specify its textual
basis.334 In the last decades before 1937, the Court began to specify that
the Equal Protection Clause provided the strongest protection against the
sort of non-public-regarding discrimination that was condemned as class
legislation.335 Nevertheless, the Court continued to insist that the Due
Process Clause, in addition to protecting against deprivations of thennewly-announced rights such as the right to contract and raise a family,
also provided at least some protection against generally arbitrary
discrimination.336
One can find a trace of that latter idea in Obergefell’s determination
that same-sex couples married for the same reasons as their opposite-sex
counterparts.337 While normally one might expect such a finding to lead
a court to decide that same-sex marriage bans simply fit badly with the
underlying reasons government recognizes marriages, Obergefell drew a
different lesson. According to Justice Kennedy, that finding led him to
conclude that same-sex marriage bans “teach[] that gays and lesbians are
unequal in important respects” and “demean[] gays and lesbians” by
“lock[ing] them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”338
This is not the language of misclassification. Rather, it is a conclusion
that excluding same-sex couples from access to marital status
subordinates—a conclusion that it “teach[es]” inequality, “demeans” its
victims, and “lock[s] them out of a central [social] institution.”339
Regardless of its grounding in due process rather than equal protection,
such effects suggest the kind of oppressive discrimination and exclusion
from a desirable status that could legitimately be described, not just as
class legislation, but more specifically as legislation that creates a
caste.340
334. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1885) (providing a detailed
explanation of the constitutional impermissibility of class legislation but failing to specify which
Fourteenth Amendment clause condemned such laws).
335. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–34 (1921) (discussing the respective roles of
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses); see also Nourse & Maguire, supra note 263, at
987 (discussing Truax).
336. See Truax, 257 U.S. at 351–52.
337. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
338. Id. at 2602.
339. Id.
340. Cf. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771 (“[DOMA’s] demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any
State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class
marriages for purposes of federal law.”). It should not be surprising, or particularly problematic
for this analogy, that Obergefell’s neo-class legislation conclusion found its doctrinal home in the
Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause. As noted earlier in the text, see text
accompanying supra notes 334–36, judges and scholars from the nineteenth and early twentieth
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To be sure, one cannot precisely equate Obergefell’s interlocking of
due process and equal protection341 to the doctrinal promiscuity of
nineteenth-century class legislation jurisprudence. That earlier
jurisprudence may have flowed uniquely from that era’s more general
conception of “rights” as the residual liberty that remains after the
legitimate scope of government power—what was called the “police
power”—ran out.342 That understanding of rights implied that the precise
identification of the right did not matter as much as it does today, when
the law considers rights as trumps, and thus insists on specifying which
right is at issue and how far that right extends.
Nevertheless, the nineteenth-century idea that the police power does
not extend to government actions that impose arbitrary burdens on
persons’ residual liberty can be analogized to Obergefell’s conclusion
that same-sex marriage bans impose an analogously arbitrary burden. For
purposes of that comparison, note Obergefell’s apparent conclusion that
same-sex marriage bans furthered no legitimate government interest,
given the Court’s understanding that same-sex marriage furthers the same
social goals as its opposite-sex counterpart.343 So understood, one could
understand bans on same-sex marriage as a modern species of the
arbitrary burdening of liberty that class legislation doctrine condemned.
Indeed, by “lock[ing] out” those relationships from an important status,
“demean[ing]” their victims, and “teach[ing]” inequality,344 those bans
could be understood as a particularly odious type of class legislation—a
type appropriately describable as imposing caste-like disabilities. To be
sure, the analogy is far from precise. But ideas of class legislation and
caste can help make an otherwise-inscrutable opinion both more
comprehensible and more firmly grounded in constitutional first
principles.

centuries recognized that both of these provisions required some level of equality, and both were
offended by laws that were exposed as class legislation. See, e.g., Truax, 257 U.S. at 312. Indeed,
Nourse and Maguire argue that at some point in the early Twentieth century, courts used the
presence of a right as a trigger for more careful class legislation scrutiny. See Nourse & Maguire,
supra note 263, at 983–84. Translating this development into modern doctrine, one could
understand Obergefell’s acknowledgement of the fundamental right to marry, see 135 S. Ct. at
2598, as triggering equally careful neo-class legislation scrutiny.
341. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 41, at 20–23.
342. See, e.g., Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 299, at 286 n.19 (collecting sources making
this point).
343. See id. at 2588–602.
344. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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D. Animus as Ill Will
While an earlier part of this Article addressed the criticism that animus
jurisprudence constitutes, at base, the “jurisprudence of denigration,”345
Part IV’s comparison between animus and caste requires returning to the
idea that the concept of animus necessarily includes some imputation of
ill will. It is unsurprising that the ill will issue should return as the ultimate
challenge facing animus doctrine. Questions about intent are central to
any coherent concept of animus, but have bedeviled the Court’s
constitutional rights jurisprudence, not just in equality law but more
generally.346 As scholars such as Professor Smith have observed, the
animus idea exacerbates these difficulties, given both the undeniably
freighted nature of the very term “animus,” the reheating of the culture
wars of the 1990s, and the Court’s willingness to venture into that
battleground.347 To Professor Smith’s catalog of reasons to worry about
animus doctrine, one can add more recent developments reflecting
renewed xenophobia in American society, and courts’ seeming
willingness to characterize it as animus.348
At the most general level, this final consideration of the descriptive
accuracy and normative appropriateness of a doctrine called “animus”
presents a problem whose full analysis far exceeds the scope of this
Article. Indeed, one can plausibly argue that the debate over animus
doctrine ultimately implicates the debate over the judiciary’s role in
enforcing constitutional rights at all, or at the very least, its enforcement
of constitutional rights beyond their thinnest, most textuallyincontestable versions. After all, a legal culture that often seems to equate
“unconstitutional” with “evil” or “benighted” almost necessarily
“denigrates” those associated with conduct that a court—and especially
the Court—determines to be unconstitutional. The heroic story America
tells itself about the Constitution—a story of setbacks and advances, but
345. Smith, Denigration, supra note 17, at 275; see supra Section III.B.
346. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990) (ruling
that judicial review under the Free Exercise Clause is triggered only by laws that target religion);
Huq, supra note 308, at 1224 (identifying a turn toward requiring intent in Equal Protection, Free
Exercise Clause, and Establishment Clause law); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431
(1996) (doing the same in Free Speech Clause law).
347. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290, 2290
(2017) (mem.) (granting cert.); see, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–07 (explaining why it was
unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court to wait and let political debate about same-sex
marriage mature further).
348. See supra Section I.B and accompanying text (describing the travel ban litigation); see
also, e.g., Keshner, supra note 16 (noting a judge’s possible reliance on anti-Latino comments
made by the President when deciding a legal challenge to the President’s rescission of the DACA
program).
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ultimately a triumphal story of good eventually prevailing over evil349—
necessarily casts as villains the characters who have ended up on the short
side of the Supreme Court vote: the police torturers,350 the censors,351 the
segregationists,352 the sexists,353 the prudes354—and now, the
homophobes?355
If this story resonates even a little,356 then query whether it is possible
to find a doctrinal vocabulary that allows for advances in human freedom
without necessarily casting aspersions on those who stand in the way.
Indeed, the very language of “advancing human freedom” necessarily
calls into question the motives of those who oppose that advance. One
can easily sympathize with Justice Kennedy in Obergefell when he
struggled to use soaring terms to portray marriage rights for same-sex
couples without simultaneously denigrating those who opposed granting
those rights. Tradition, deeply held and deeply respectable religious
belief:357 How could these concepts be lauded when they blocked access
to such admirable concepts, advanced by such admirable people?358
349. See generally, e.g., RICHARD D. MOHR, THE LONG ARC OF JUSTICE: LESBIAN AND GAY
MARRIAGE, EQUALITY, AND RIGHTS (2005) (discussing, prior to Obergefell, the hope that samesex marriage would be legalized by the Court).
350. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 278 (1936).
351. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
352. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
353. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996).
354. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 154–55 (1974).
355. To be sure, some villainous characters have taken the form of defenders of
constitutional rights—in the stereotypical telling, the Lochner-era defenders of a so-called liberty
of contract who were, at, base, simply defending the right to exploit. But opponents of that right
were ultimately able to cast themselves as the true defenders of constitutional rights, correctly
understood. See, e.g., REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 68–69 (2006) (explaining, in quasiconstitutional terms, the rights of labor unions to organize for better pay and working conditions,
and for statutory protections). More recently, Lochner “revisionists” have sought—with some
success—to flip the traditional script, and to cast defenders of economic rights as standing in
similar, if not the exact same, shoes as the defenders of more traditionally-celebrated
constitutional rights. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 122–25 (2011) (concluding that Lochner and
similar, individual-rights jurisprudence have been unfairly maligned).
356. Not every story about constitutional rights will take this form. For example,
governments seeking to restrict guns are generally not portrayed as evil, but, at least in mainstream
tellings, as (at worst) well-intentioned officials sincerely concerned about gun violence. See
ZIETLOW, supra note 355, at 76 (suggesting that regulators of the labor market could also be
understood as well-intentioned). Thanks to Lee Strang for this insight.
357. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (describing the views of
those who oppose same-sex marriage in those terms).
358. See id. at 2594–95 (presenting, in very favorable light, the stories of the plaintiffs in the
litigation); see also Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136, 138 & 138 n.9 (2015)
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One answer is to employ doctrinal indirection. For example, had the
Obergefell Court concluded that sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, then discrimination implicating that trait would be subject
to more stringent proof requirements that it likely could not have satisfied
in the case of marriage.359 But this effacing of the underlying normative
judgment is only skin-deep. As Justice Scalia recognized (and protested)
in Romer, a holding that sexual orientation discrimination requires more
than the barest public-regarding justification “places the prestige of [the
Court] behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as
reprehensible as racial or religious bias.”360
But Romer did not even involve explicitly heightened scrutiny.361
Such heightened scrutiny would have made the normative argument
against homophobia (and thus, presumably, homophobes) even clearer,
given that traditional suspect class analysis inquires into concepts such as
the general relevance of the classification trait and the group’s (unfair362)
political powerlessness.363 If such a trait was held to be generally
irrelevant and a marker for an unfairly marginalized group, but yet was
employed in a given law, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
enactors of that law—such as the Coloradans who voted for Amendment
2—must simply have disliked that group. The only other explanations
would hold that the majority was simply woefully uninformed about that
group or indifferent to its well-being (another form of denigration, to be
sure).364
The fundamental rights route similarly offers little hope of evading
the implied moral judgment condemning homophobes. Ultimately, rights
are fundamental for those who are deemed potentially proper recipients
of that right.365 The right to vote is fundamental, but nobody thinks strict
(describing how the plaintiffs in Obergefell were chosen for their likely attractiveness to
mainstream American society).
359. For one scholar’s argument that this doctrinal path was the preferable path to same-sex
marriage rights, see Conkle, supra note 29.
360. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice
Scalia’s quote implicitly criticized the Court’s stand against “disfavoring” homosexuality, thus
suggesting that such disfavoring need not even satisfy minimal constitutional standards.
361. See id. at 631, 634 (basing the Court’s holding not upon strict scrutiny, but rather, upon
a finding of animus, which cannot withstand rational basis review).
362. See ELY, supra note 126, at 152 (conceding that the political powerlessness prong of
suspect class analysis had to refer to powerlessness that was in some way “discreditable” or
unwarranted); see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
740–41 (1985) (making a similar argument, but as part of a critique of standard suspect class
criteria).
363. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689–90 (1973).
364. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 273, at 65.
365. Indeed, this observation helps explain at a doctrinal level the practical emphasis in
impact litigation such as that challenging same-sex marriage bans on finding what one scholar
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scrutiny is required to justify its denial to a precocious fourteen yearold.366 If the right to marriage extends to same-sex couples because the
right is fundamental, it must be because same-sex couples are proper
recipients of that right. Of course, this is exactly what Justice Kennedy
said in Obergefell when he concluded that gays and lesbians marry for
the same socially desirable reasons as heterosexuals.367 Indeed, it’s what
he had to say, lest the fundamental nature of the right to marry therefore
mean that it must extend to children and polyamorous groupings. As with
the heightened equal protection scrutiny route, the due process
fundamental rights route requires validating the claim that sexual
orientation is a morally and practically neutral feature, either generally
(in the case of a heightened scrutiny approach) or within the context of
the right in question (in the case of a fundamental rights approach).
Opposition to claims stated through either route thus becomes hard to
express in terms that allow that opposition to escape moral taint.
A final approach is to emphasize the distinction between the public
and the private realm. Under this approach, the Court purports to
withhold judgments about the correctness vel non of moral qualms about
homosexuality and simply decrees, as a matter of jurisprudential
housekeeping, that such qualms per se have no place in government
decision-making. Thus, as Justice Kennedy concluded in both Lawrence
and Obergefell, privately held moral precepts about sexuality, marriage,
and family simply have no place in law, at least when they have the
oppressive effect Justice Kennedy described in those cases.368 This
approach has the benefit of rendering such qualms legally irrelevant, and
thus obviating any need for courts to condemn them. Indeed, it allows
even more: As in Obergefell, it allows a court to pay homage to the
sincerity and goodwill with which those qualms are held and expressed,
while nevertheless ruling them jurisprudentially out of bounds.369
This approach opens the door, if only a crack, to a thin understanding
of rights such as the same-sex marriage right. Under this approach, moral
disapproval of the right (or of the equality claim) is disallowed as a factor
and drops out of the analysis. This leaves the government to defend the
rights deprivation or discrimination on utilitarian grounds—as some
calls “perfect plaintiffs.” See Godsoe, supra note 358, at 155 (describing the process of plaintiff
selection in several foundational individual rights litigations).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
367. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
368. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting with approval a previous
dissenting opinion arguing that a legislative majority’s view that certain conduct is immoral does
not authorize it to criminalize that conduct); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602; see also Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 575 (describing the oppressive effects of Texas’s sodomy laws); Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2604 (describing the oppressive effects of same-sex marriage bans).
369. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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states did, unsuccessfully, in the run-up to Obergefell when they offered
child welfare and so-called “accidental procreation” arguments as
justifications for same-sex marriage bans.370 Under this approach, culture
war issues such as same-sex marriage become straightforward questions
of a challenged law’s fit with a utilitarian justification.371 As such, courts
are relieved of any need to rule on an animus ground.
The problem is that the private realm is not so easily cabined. Florists,
photographers, and bakers may all have private views about same-sex
marriage, but when those views affect their conduct in the public sphere,
their rights to private belief collide with governmental recognition and
protection of the other side’s public status as equal members of the
community. This, of course, is the issue today.372 Whether the Court can
find a satisfactory dividing line between the public and the private realms
is a matter of much doubt.373 Perhaps more importantly, any dividing line
the Court offers may well be understood as endorsing “animus” on the
part of the prevailing side—either the religious objectors whose
objections would become constitutionally accommodated, or the
beneficiaries of the anti-discrimination law who would gain the right to
compel conduct those objectors find deeply offensive.
CONCLUSION: ANIMUS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
It should not be surprising that the rise of animus analysis has been
controversial. Its aggressively personal tone, when combined with its
undertheorized application in Supreme Court cases that have employed
it, make criticism understandable, especially when it is used in high
370. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014).
371. For one expression of this approach, with a fairly clear motivation to shore up the ability
of persons to continue expressing opposition to the claimed right within the private sphere, see
Brief of Douglas Laycock, Thomas C. Berg, David Blankenhorn, Marie A. Failinger, and Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, 12–13, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (arguing that government lacks a legitimate interest
to deny same-sex marriage rights, but urging the Court to consider expanding rights to religiousbased private conduct opposing same-sex marriage).
372. See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (“The case presents difficult questions as to
the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its
governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be,
married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of
all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
373. See, e.g., James M. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, the
Ministerial Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 142, 145 (2015)
(discussing the public-private divide in the context of the debate over religious belief-based
exemptions from civil rights laws implicating hot-button cultural issues); see also Steve Sanders,
RFRAs and Reasonableness, 91 IND. L.J. 243, 265–66 (2016) (acknowledging this difficulty and
calling for restraint on both sides of this issue).
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profile cases that reflect deep-seated cultural dissensus. It is also
understandable why it might trigger frustration among those who see it
as useful only in a limited number of situations—but nevertheless a
potential distraction for courts faced with the important business of
meaningfully testing government action that is alleged to discriminate on
more prosaic bases, such as an action’s alleged lack of a rational basis.
To repeat, much of this critique should not be a surprise. Name calling
really does poison the dialogue that may become necessary after a heated
issue is decided and the time comes for post-war negotiations over the
details of the final settlement. If animus really does distract courts and
litigators from the hard, unglamorous work of proving the irrationality of
government action, and thus impedes the progress of social movements
which have only rational basis claims available at the start of their
litigation sagas, there is reason to be dispirited. The undertheorized nature
of the Court’s animus decisions can only add insult to these injuries.
Yet the doctrine persists, and, indeed, seems to be flowering.374 In
part, this may be due to our current circumstances, in which the label
“animus” truly seems to describe government action in a way that has not
generally been the case in recent American history.375 But it may also be
persisting because of its instinctive resonance. The framers’ concern with
faction and nineteenth-century jurists’ concern with class legislation both
reflect similar concerns to those underlying the modern animus cases—
concerns about private interests and private prejudices motivating
government action.376 These concerns, of course, can be understood quite
broadly; thus, they can be understood as supporting a variety of
jurisprudential approaches to the Constitution’s guarantee of equality.377
But surely one way to instantiate those concerns today is to ask directly
and explicitly what one might legitimately describe as a foundational
question in any equal protection case: Is government acting “not to
further a proper legislative end but to make [a burdened group] unequal
to everyone else?”378 The difficulty lies in translating into workable
doctrine the “majestic generalit[y]”379 underlying that question. This
Article has aspired to do some of that work.
374. See supra Part I.
375. To be sure, this observation can be overstated; presumably, every generation fights its
cultural battles, which may seem to that generation uniquely difficult or mean-spirited. Struggles
for racial and sex equality have at times been every bit as bitter as our current conflicts. But see
Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 92, at 169 (describing some of President Trump’s
statements relating to the immigration bans as “some of the grossest public statements made by
any President in recent memory”).
376. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 3, at 226–30; supra Sections IV.A–B.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 319–321.
378. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
379. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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Finally, any speculation about the future of animus doctrine would be
incomplete without addressing the retirement of Justice Anthony
Kennedy in July 2018.380 Justice Kennedy, the author of Romer, Windsor,
Obergefell, and Masterpiece, has done more than any other modern
justice to promote the animus idea. It would be deeply unfortunate if his
departure from the Court caused a halt in the evolution of the animus
principle, or even its complete abandonment, just at the moment when a
coherent doctrine is starting to appear.

380. Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/7GEZ-NPWH].
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